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Abstract

An event study is a statistical regression analysis that merely provides one
method of examining the effect of an event, such as a disclosure of information on the market price of a security. Yet the law governing event studies
has become inseparablefrom the substantive law governing securitiesfraud
litigation. Courts have effectively collapsed securitiesfraud actions into a
single question: Whether the defendant's misrepresentation or omission
created a disparity between the transaction price of a security and its true
value measured by the precise reaction of the market price to the disclosure
of the concealed information. A misrepresentationor omission that creates
that disparity is material. Plaintiffs who invest at a market price that com-
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municates that disparity have shown reliance by the fraud on that market
price. The disclosure of the previously concealed information alters the
market price to create economic loss, so plaintiffs can establish loss causation. The measure of damages then quantifies that precise alterationor correction in the market price.
The interrelatedquestions of materiality, reliance, loss causation, and damages all require an event study for their resolution. As such, an investor
who fails to offer an event study performed by a qualified expert has little
chance of prevailing. The dispositive role now played by event studies,
however, is inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment and the federal securities laws. Rather, an event study requirement poses an unconstitutional and unwarrantedbarrierto meritorious securitiesfraud suits.
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I.

Introduction.

An event study is a statistical regression analysis that merely provides one
method of examining the effect of an event, such as the disclosure of information on
the market price of a particular security. Yet the law governing event studies has become inseparable from the substantive law governing securities fraud litigation.
Courts have effectively collapsed securities fraud actions into a single question:
Whether the defendant's misrepresentation or omission
created a disparity between the transaction price of a security and its
true value measured by the precise reaction of the market price to
the disclosure of the concealed information.
A misrepresentation or omission that creates that disparity is material. Plaintiffs who invest at a market price that communicates that disparity have shown reliance by the fraud on that market price. The disclosure of the previously concealed
information alters the market price to create economic loss, so plaintiffs can establish
loss causation. The measure of damages then quantifies that precise alteration or
correction in the market price.
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The interrelated questions of materiality, reliance, loss causation, and damages all require an event study for their resolution. The overriding substantive issue
in securities fraud cases has become whether an expert has proffered an opinion
based on a reliable event study. Thus, event studies have become an indispensable
element to securities fraud actions.' As such, a defrauded investor who fails to offer
a reliable event study performed by a qualified expert has little chance of prevailing.
The dispositive role now played by event studies, however, is inconsistent with the
Seventh Amendment and the federal securities laws. Rather, an event study requirement poses an unconstitutional and unwarranted barrier to meritorious securities fraud suits.
This Article will show that a properly conducted event study 2 is not just a
helpful way to present evidence of essential elements of a securities fraud action, it
has become a substantive and essential element of a securities fraud claim itself.
First, Part II of this Article details the steps necessary to conduct a proper and admissible event study for purposes of securities litigation. This Part also shows how
the elements of securities actions uniquely lend themselves to event study analysis.3

1 This could just be further evidence of the federal courts' continuing hostility to the
private Rule 10b-5 action. See, e.g., Joanne Doroshow, Gordon Gekko Justice Makes a Comeback,
132 RECORDER 56 (Mar. 21, 2008) (arguing the Supreme Court in Stoneridge ushered in an era of
"Gordon Gekko justice" whereby shareholders are more vulnerable and the integrity of American markets more exposed than in decades); Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the ProperRole of Confidential Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 345, 354-57 (2008) (arguing that the federal courts have unjustifiably
heightened the pleading standard for confidential informants in securities litigation making
private recovery more difficult); Charles W. Murdock, Sarbanes-Oxley, CorporateCorruption, and
the Complicity of Courts and Legislatures, 6 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (arguing Congress and the Supreme Court have been complicit in fraud from the late 1970s by gradually
rescinding investor protections or outright enacting investor-hostile procedures); Matthew L.
Mustokoff, FraudNot on the Market: Rebutting the Presumption of Classwide Reliance Twenty Years
After Basic Inc v. Levinson, 4 HASTiNGS Bus. L.J. 225, 226 (2008) (stating, "In a wave of recent decisions, the courts have made it tougher for plaintiffs to demonstrate that a particular security
trades in an efficient market for purposes of triggering the classwide presumption of reliance.... [A principal reason for this is that] the courts have interpreted Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 . . . more stringently in recent years."); Samuel H. Rudman, Oscar: Misinterpretation of the Fraud-on-the-MarketTheory, 240 N.Y.L.J. 3 (July 17, 2008) (stating that two recent federal court decisions are in direct conflict with controlling Supreme Court precedent and erroneously create a new class certification requirement by placing a burden on plaintiffs to prove
the merits of their case before trial)..
2
Throughout this Article, the terms "event study," "regression analysis," and
"event study analysis" will be used interchangeably. Event studies are used in a variety of
other litigation settings outside of securities fraud cases.
3 See infra Part II (discussing requirements to admit an event study as evidence and
what constitutes a "reliable" event study).
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Part III of this Article next demonstrates that the elements of materiality, reliance in
fraud-on-the-market cases, loss causation, and damages as defined by the federal
courts all depend on a showing of post-disclosure price movement. 4 Then, as Part IV
shows, courts have recently held that the only way to show that a stock price movement was caused by disclosure is through a properly conducted event study.5 Nevertheless, as Part V establishes, requiring an event study at the initial stages of the
plaintiffs' case takes fact questions regarding materiality, reliance, causation and
damages from the province of the jury in contravention of the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial.6 Additionally, it imposes an unjustifiable barrier to meritorious
claims inconsistent with the language of the securities laws. Moreover, any requirement that an expert be called to present a statistical regression analysis to establish
materiality, reliance, loss causation, and damages is inconsistent with the policies
underlying the federal securities laws.7
II.

Event Studies and Securities Litigation.

"The securities markets have grown increasingly complex." 8 This increasing
complexity has created new challenges in prosecuting and defending securities fraud
cases.9 To meet these new challenges, securities fraud plaintiffs often employ experts
armed with event studies.10 Part of the resounding success of event study analysis in
securities fraud actions is because event studies provide a metric for measuring a
specific event's effect on stock prices." Thus, there has been an overwhelming endorsement in the federal courts for the use of event studies in securities litigation.12

4
See infra Part III (discussing the elements of materiality, reliance in fraud-on-themarket cases, loss causation, and damages).
5
See infra Part IV (demonstrating how the federal courts have dismissed a securities
fraud action absent a reliable event study).

6
See infra Part V (stating that the event study requirement takes factual determinations from the jury and also usurps the jury's function to preference competing experts).
7 See infra Part VI (showing that the securities laws do not require a post-transaction
price decline or an event study for that matter; and that such a requirement unnecessarily impedes meritorious securities class actions).

8 Joseph W. Martini et al., The Need for Expert Testimony in Complex Securities Cases,
JurorsMight Require Extra Help, 34 CoNN. L. TRIB. 20 (May 26, 2008).
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, The Role of FinancialEconomics in Securities Fraud Cases: Applicationsat the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 Bus. LAW. 545, 54546 (1994).
11 Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of CorporateLaw, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 380 (2002).
12
See, e.g., Elaine Buckberg & Frederick Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive Demands and

Remedial Offers, 63 Bus. LAW. 347, 362 (2008) (stating that in securities litigation courts widely

accept event studies); Madge S. Thorsen et al., Rediscovering the Economics of Loss Causation, 6 J.
Bus. & SEC. L. 93 (2006) (describing the event study as the "gold standard" accepted by courts
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This Section demonstrates that event studies, as a useful (and essential) tool in securities litigation, must first constitute admissible evidence.13 In other words, event studies must meet the traditional Daubert test for scientific evidence. Next, this Part discusses what constitutes a proper event study. After detailing the requirements for a
proper event study, this Part will provide a brief overview of the essential elements
of a securities fraud claim to illuminate how a securities fraud claim is particularly
well-suited for event study analysis.14
A.

Admitting an Event Study as Evidence and Conducting a Proper Analysis.

1.Meeting the DaubertStandard.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 an expert is someone with specialized
knowledge.15 An expert may testify when it will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.16 An expert can base his testimony on
facts or data of three kinds, so long as they are of the kind reasonably relied upon by
experts in the field: (1) an expert can rely on facts or data learned by firsthand observation before the hearing; (2) an expert may rely on facts or data that he learns at the
hearing; and (3) an expert may rely on what amounts to outside data, or information
garnered by consulting other sources.17
In Daubertv. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,the Supreme Court held that expert
testimony set forth as scientific evidence must satisfy a special standard: the scientific

and economists).
13
See infra Part II.A.
14 See infra Part II.B.
15 FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.").
16 FED. R. EVID. 702. The standard is intended to be generous.
CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULEs 603 (5th ed. 2004).
17
FED. R. EVID. 703 ("The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's
opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.").
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evidence must be generally accepted in the pertinent community.1 8 Under the Daubert test, the court must ascertain that: (1) the theory or technique has been appropriately tested and found valid; (2) the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review; (3) the error rate is low enough so that the theory or technique is reliable; and
(4) the theory or technique is generally accepted within the profession. 19 When an
expert employs an event study, his opinion: (1) becomes testable, (2) is supported by
published literature / peer review, (3) is subject to a known or potential rate of error,
and (4) follows procedures that derive from objective standards making it generally
accepted. 20 In other words, through an event study, an expert's testimony can meet
all the prongs of the Supreme Court's Daubert standard. 21
2.Conducting a Proper Event Study Analysis.
For an event study to be admissible it has to be proper so as not to constitute
junk science. The traditional definition of an event study is "a statistical regression
analysis that examines the effect of an event, such as an allegedly fraudulent statement or omission, on a dependent variable, such as a company's stock price." 22
Event study methodology is founded on the efficient market hypothesis,23 a hypothesis endorsed by the Supreme Court.24 Under the efficient market hypothesis, a security's price reflects all publicly available information. 5 Thus, in terms of an event
study, a change in stock price in light of a public announcement is owing to the arrival of new information in the market provided by that announcement. 26 A proper
18
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993); MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, at 620. Whether an expert's scientific data is admissible only arises after it
is established that the individual whose testimony is being offered is an expert in the particular field. In
re Apollo Group, Inc., Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 957, 960 (D. Ariz. 2007).
19 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148
(1999) (extending Daubert to all expert testimony presenting technical or specialized material).

20

MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, The PSLRA's Damages Formula and Experts, in 26 SEC. LITIG.

DAMAGES § 3:14.50 (Thomson/West 2008).
21 Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am. Inc., 380 F.3d 459 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that a
regression analysis is subject to Daubert for expert scientific testimony); Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 362 F. Supp. 2d 487, 494 (D. Del. 2005) (stating expert testimony was admissible under
Daubert where experts employed standard regression analysis). "The Ninth Circuit has approved the
use of regression analyses as 'common statistical tool[s]." In re Apollo Group, Inc., Sec. Litig., 527 F.
Supp. 2d 957, 963 (D. Ariz. 2007) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw., Inc., 885 F.3d 575, 577
n.3 (9th Cir. 1989)).
22

MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, Event Studies, in 26 SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES

§

25:B

(Thomson/West 2008) ("An event study combines principles of finance (e.g. what factors influence a
company's stock price or the extent to which a company's stock price incorporates all publicly available
information) with principles of statistics (e.g., collecting and analyzing data and identifying, isolating,
and quantifying numerous variables that may account for the resulting pattern of data).").
23 Mitchell & Netter, supra note 10, at 557.
24 Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245-47 (1989).
25 Mitchell & Netter, supra note 10, at 557.
26 Id. Studies support this hypothesis, showing that stock prices react quickly to the arrival
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event study consists of four general steps:
Step One.Identify the Event.27

First, an event study must identify the "event" that causes investors to
change their expectations about the value of the company. 28 Some examples of
"events" include takeovers, equity offerings, change in the state of incorporation,
adoption of antitakeover provisions, filing lawsuits, deaths of corporate executives,
and product recalls to name a few. 29 In securities fraud, the "event" is the subject of
the alleged fraud. After the event is identified, the expert must determine when the
event was made known to the public, or the "announcement date."30 This assessment requires that it be known when the news reached the market. Also, there must
be no reason to believe that the market anticipated the news, otherwise it would not

be the date upon which the market learned of the event.
Step Two. Establishan Event Window.

Once an event has been identified, the expert must select an "event window"
or a period over which stock price movements are calculated. 3' Typically, this window starts at the end of the trading day, or before news of the event reached the public. 32 The difficulty in establishing an event window lies in determining the cut-off
date for the window.33 The longer an event window, the more likely it is to incorporate the release of the news and the market's reaction to it. But it is also then more
likely that the market reaction will be related to other effects unrelated to the studied
event.M Because information may leak several days before the actual fraudulent

of new information, often within a matter of seconds. Id.
27 This is generally the most important part of the event study methodology. It is not left up
to the experts conducting the event study. Rather, the event is determined by the plaintiffs' attorneys.
Linda Allen, Meeting Daubert Standards in CalculatingDamagesfor ShareholderClass Action Litigation, 62 Bus. LAW. 955, 958 (2007).
28 Mitchell & Netter, supra note 10, at 557.
29
Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique and
CorporateLitigation,4 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 141, 144 (2002).
30 Bhagat & Romano, Event Studies PartI, supra note 29, at 144. The Wall Street Journal
Index, Lexis-Nexis, and Thompson FinancialSecurities Data are increasingly used as popular sources
for announcement dates. Id. Some events may have several event dates or several announcement dates,
i.e., through a leakage theory. Id. at 145.
31 David Tabak & Frederick Dunbar, Materiality and Magnitude: Event Studies in the Courtroom
7
(NERA
Working
Paper
No.
34,
(Apr.
1999),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=166408.
32 Tabak & Dunbar, Materiality and Magnitude:Event Studies in the Courtroom, supra note
31 at 7.
33 Allen, supra note 27, at 958; see U.S. v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 447, 453 (D. Conn.
2008) (stating that an event study was not justified because the event window was too long).
34 Tabak & Dunbar, Materialityand Magnitude: Event Studies in the Courtroom,supra note
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event, and because the market may take a day to react to the information if the announcement is made just after the market closes or late in the trading day, experts
usually employ a three-day event window starting a day before and ending a day after the event.35

Step Three.Control for Market and Industry Effects to Get an Estimated RelationBetween the Company and the Market.

ship

Third, the expert must examine the stock price performance around the
event. This requires that the expert isolate the effect of the event from other market,
industry, or company-specific factors simultaneously affecting the company's stock
price.37
36

Suppose, for example, that defendants make a false, unexpected, and positive announcement about an issuer and the price of
that issuer's stock rises on the next trading day. But suppose that the
market generally improves on that day and that the prices of other
stocks in the issuer's industry also enjoy gains on that day. The
question that an event study examines is whether the false announcement caused the price of the issuer's stock to go up at all - in-

stead of market and industry developments causing the entire price
rise - and if the defendant's announcement did have some price effect, what part of the company's stock price increase was attributable
to the announcement as opposed to other factors.38
After ruling out other factors, the expert attempts to determine whether the

31 at 8.
35 Allen, supra note 27, at 958; see also Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in
Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1421, 1435 (1994).
36 Mitchell & Netter, supra note 10, at 560.
37 In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (N.D. Cal. 1994). To isolate
the effect of market forces and industry factors, an event study will employ a comparative index model:
R =a+bMR+cMR=e
Where:
R = the return on the stock (i.e., its movement for each day in question)

a = "alpha"; the constant return on the stock regardless of market or industry forces
(generally presumed to be zero)
b = "beta"; the percentage of linear correlation between the return of the stock price
of a company and the return of the market, measured by an index. Indices include the S&P
500 Index for example. The beta is multiplied by the market return (MR).

c = the percentage of linear correlation between the return of the stock price of a
company and the average return on the stock of a peer group (similar industry) measured by
an index. This is multiplied by the industry return (IR).
e = "epsilon"; the error term of the regression.
KAUFMAN, Event Studies, supra note 22.
38
William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of
Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 872 (2005).
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stock price movement is abnormal. 39 "A large abnormal stock price movement occurring at the same time the market receives news about an event suggests that the
event caused the abnormal price movement."4o
To rule out other market and industry factors, the expert must calculate the
relationship of the specific company's stock with the general market. The expert will
measure the stock price's sensitivity to general market conditions. 41 To do this, an
expert will run a "regression" of the company's stock price on a market and/or industry index over a period of time ("estimation window"). The period of time selected for the regression analysis is generally close to the event window. 42 The result
of this regression analysis is a quantified relationship between the company and the
market. The regression analysis will reveal a statistic measure of the strength of the
relationship between the company's stock price movements and the market and industry indices.43
Step Four.Estimatethe Effects of the Event.
Fourth, the estimated relationships achieved by the regression analysis are
applied to control for market and industry movements in the event window.44 Then,
the predicted return is compared to the actual return in the event window. The difference between the two is the abnormal or excess return. This return must be statistically significant so the results are not because of mere chance. This excess return is
multiplied by the company stock price to provide an estimate of the per-share dollar
effect of the event. 45
To summarize:
[A]n event study is similar to a medical experiment in which
there is a control group and a treatment group. The control group
provides the benchmark against which the treatment group is compared to determine if the event being studied had any effect. In a securities setting, the control group is established by modeling the
normal relationship of a stock's price movements to movements of a
market and/or industry index. The difference between the stock

Mitchell & Netter, supra note 10, at 560.
Id.
Allen, supra note 27, at 957.
42
Tabak & Dunbar, supra note 31, at 9. Generally, an estimation window is placed
slightly before the event window so it covers a "clean" period untainted by any fraud that may
have affected the stock price. Id. Where multiple events are studied, the estimation window
39

40
41

may encompass the event windows. Id.
43

Id. at 10.

44

Id. at 11.

45

Id.
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price movement we actually observe and the movement we expected
to observe (i.e. the difference between the treatment and the control
group) that occurs upon the release of a particular piece of information is called the excess price movement of the stock at the time of
the event. This excess price movement is tested for statistical significance to see whether the result is unusual or unlikely to be explained by the normal random variations of the stock price. 46
As the following Subpart demonstrates, the event study methodology is particularly compatible with securities fraud actions.

B.

Event Studies as They Relate to Securities Fraud Actions.

Securities fraud actions uniquely lend themselves to event study analysis.
Securities fraud actions brought under Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act4 7
and the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") Rule 10b-548 allow a private
plaintiff to recover damages caused by an act or omission resulting in fraud or deceit
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 49 To state a cause of action
under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must allege and prove six elements: (1) that the defendant made a material misrepresentation or omission (materiality); (2) that the defendant acted with a wrongful state of mind (scienter5O); (3) that the material misrepre46 DAVID TABAK, NERA, MAKING ASSESSMENTS ABOUT MATERIALITY LESS SUBJECTIVE
THROUGH
THE
USE
OF
CONTENT
ANALYSIS
694
(2007),
http://www.nera.com/image/PUBTabakContentAnalysis_.SEC1646-FINAL.pdf.
An

event study is most useful in determining the effects of new information on security prices
when: (1) there is a well-defined public disclosure or announcement; (2) the time that the news
item reaches the market is known; (3) there is no reason to believe that the market anticipated
the news item; and (4) it is possible to isolate the effect of the news item from market, industry,

and other issuer-specific factors simultaneously affecting the price. Id.
47 Securities Exchange Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1934) ("It shall be unlawful for any
person ... to sue or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any
manipulative or deceptive device in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.").
48 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The Rule 10b-5 action is an implied right of action. See, e.g.,

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers

Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). The availability of a Rule 10b-5 action is now beyond
doubt because of legislative acquiescence, judicial consensus, and the test of time. MICHAEL J.
KAUFMAN, Conclusion, in 26A SEC. LITIG. DAMAGES §29:1 (Thomson/West 2009).
49 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
50 Scienter is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 185 n.1. Currently, there are three different ways to establish scienter: (1) plaintiffs can state a claim by pleading either (a) motive and opportunity or (b) strong

circumstantial evidence of recklessness or conscious misbehavior, Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d
300, 309-10 (2d Cir. 2000), (2) plaintiffs can state a claim by pleading facts showing (a) simple
recklessness or (b) a motive to commit fraud and opportunity, In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999), and (3) plaintiffs can state a claim by pleading enough

facts that establish altogether a strong inference of scienter. see, e.g., Ottmann v. Hangar OrHeinOnline -- 15 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 194 2009-2010
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sentation or omission was made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security
(in connection with); (4) that the plaintiff relied on the material misrepresentation (reliance); (5) that the plaintiff suffered an economic loss as a result (economic loss); and
51
(6) that the material misrepresentation actually caused the loss (loss causation).
Event studies have been a well-established method for calculating the effect of an
event on stock prices for more than forty years. 52 Because event studies can isolate
the effect of each false statement on a stock's price, they are used to establish mate53
riality, reliance, damages, and loss causation.
Materiality. A misrepresented or omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that it would be important to a reasonable investor. 4 The test for
materiality is whether the subject fraud altered the total mix of information available
to investors in such a way as to affect their investment decisions.55 Definitions of materiality all tend to relate back to whether the decision by a reasonable investor to
trade at a particular price would have been affected by knowing the omitted or misstated information.5 6 The materiality standard is objective.57 Thus, materiality can be
objectively measured with an event study, as an event study can determine the likelihood that a stock price changed as a result of the fraud and not as a result of some
other factor.58 The event study method is an accepted method of evaluating materiality. 59
thopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540,
550-52 (6th Cir. 2000). Scienter also must be established with a "strong inference." 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4(b)(2) (2009). The Supreme Court recently clarified that this strong inference requirement
mandates a holistic assessment whereby courts weigh both culpable and nonculpable inferences on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,
323-24 (2007).
51 Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
52 Allen, supra note 27, at 957.
53 Fisher, supra note 38, at 847; Mitchell & Netter, supra note 10, at 547-50.
m TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976). "Whether information
is material ... depends on other information already available to the market; unless the statement 'significantly altered the total mix of information' available, it will not be considered material." In re Sprint Corp. Sec. Litig., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1215 (D. Kan. 2002).
55

Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance,31

DEL. J. CORP.
56

L. 455, 468 (2006).

Id. at 467.

57 TSC Indus. Inc., 426 U.S. at 445.
58

Tabak & Dunbar, Materiality and Magnitude: Event Studies in the Courtroom, supra

note 31, at 3. Puffing is a concept related to materiality. Soft "puffing" statements generally
lack materiality because the market price of a share is not inflated by vague statements. JOHN
C. COFFEE ET AL., SEcuRmEs REGULATION 984 (10th ed. 2007).
59 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that a regression analysis is an acceptable method of demonstrating the effect of an event on stock
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For instance, if the information causes more investors to want to buy the
stock, the price will rise until the demand for the stock equals the supply. 60 Materially positive news causes a stock's price to rise, but if the information is immaterial,
then investors' decisions to buy are unaffected.61 Thus, an expert-usually an accountant, economist, or investment banker - may be used to track the movement of
a stock's price in reaction to the disclosure of the allegedly material facts. The expert
can then opine as to the probability that this movement was caused by the release of
the material information or by events unrelated to the disclosure. 62 If the event study
discloses no significant or abnormal change in the stock price, the information is
deemed immaterial.63
Reliance in Fraud-on-the-MarketCases. Securities fraud plaintiffs must also
demonstrate that they relied on the defendant's misrepresentation or omission. Reliance is an essential element for Rule 10b-5 liability because it ensures that there is
the requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and the injury.64 Plaintiffs can either present direct evidence of their actual reliance, in which
case there is no role for an expert or event study analysis, or they can invoke a presumption of reliance. In Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, the Court
noted that there are two instances when a rebuttable presumption of reliance exists:
(1) if there is an omission of a material fact by one with a duty to disclose; and (2) if
the statement at issue becomes public, thereby falling under the fraud-on-the-market
presumption. 65
The second instance, the "fraud-on-the-market" presumption, presumes a
plaintiff's reliance when the statement at issue becomes public. According to the
presumption, because all public information is reflected in the market price of the security, 66 it can be assumed that an investor who buys or sells stock at the market
price relies upon false statements made publicly. 67 Judge Richard A. Posner aptly ilprice); In re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
60

468.

Dunbar & Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, supra note 55, at

61
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997) ("In the context of an 'efficient' market, the concept of materiality translates into information that alters the
price of the firm's stock."); Dunbar & Heller, supra note 55, at 468.

62

J. KAUFMAN, Materiality, in

MICHAEL

EXPERT WITNESSEs: SECURITIES CASES

§2:23

(Thomson/West 2008).
63
PETER B. FRANK ET AL., LITIGATION SERvIcEs HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE
ACCOUNTANT AS EXPERT WITNESs 167 (1990).

Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008).
Id. (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (presuming
fraud where there is an omission and a duty to disclose) and Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224 (1988) (presuming fraud under the fraud-on-the-market presumption)).
64
65

Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 241-42.
Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics, Seventy-Five Defenses Securities Litigators
Need to Know, 62 Bus. LAW. 1281, 1323 (2007).
66

67
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lustrates the fraud-on-the-market presumption:
Suppose ... that a misrepresentation in a prospectus for a
new issue of stock leads brokers who read the prospectus to buy
large amounts of the stock and to recommend that their customers
do likewise. As a result, the price rises. Suppose someone who has
no knowledge of the prospectus - in fact no idea why the stock's
price has risen - buys it at its higher price. Later the fraud is unmasked and the price falls. Should this someone be allowed to sue
the issuer? The Supreme Court has announced yes, and this is the
economically correct answer. The fraud is impounded in the market
price, and the person who buys without knowledge of the prospectus is acting on false information to the same extent as those who
buy with knowledge.68
The plaintiff is presumed to have relied on that information known by the
market and incorporated into the market price. For the presumption to apply, the
plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant made public material misstatements; (2)
that the defendant's shares were traded in an efficient market; 69 and (3) that the
plaintiff traded shares between the time the misrepresentations were made and the
time the truth was revealed. 70 Similar to materiality, an event study can show that a
misrepresentation or corrective disclosure had a statistically significant effect on the
price of a stock, thereby demonstrating that the market 'relied' on the misrepresentation.
Loss Causation. An event study is also useful to demonstrate loss causation.
Loss causation is an essential element of Rule 10b-5 liability. 7' Loss causation refers

68

RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW

459 (6th ed. 2003).

Whether a market is an "efficient" market depends on certain factors including:
(1) the average trading volume; (2) the number of securities analysts following the stock; (3)
the number of market makers; (3) whether a company is entitled to file a registration statement
for trading; and (5) certain evidence of a cause and effect relationship between news and stockprice changes. In re Nature's Sunshine Prods. Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 2:06-CV-267-TS, 2008 WL
436588, at *6 (D. Utah Sept. 25, 2008).
70 Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance, 487 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2007).
71
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005). It was codified as an
element in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"). 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
Loss causation has been called ungainly, exotic, confusing, and even unhappy. Michael J.
Kaufman, Loss Causation: Exposing a Fraud on Securities Law Jurisprudence,24 IND. L. REv. 357,
357 (1991). The very first court to employ the term "loss causation" accorded it relative insignificance. Id. at 360. Since its inception, loss causation has proven to be a muddied and misunderstood element, leading some to advocate for its outright abandonment. Id. at 359.
69

HeinOnline -- 15 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 197 2009-2010

Stanford Journalof Law, Business & Finance

198

Vol l5:1

to the direct causal link between the misstatement and the economic loss.72 It requires that plaintiffs prove that the defendant's misrepresentations or omissions not
only caused them to invest, but also were the cause of their actual economic losses.73
In Dura Pharmaceuticalsv. Broudo, the Supreme Court held that securities fraud plaintiffs could not adequately allege loss causation by alleging only that the plaintiffs
purchased securities at an artificially high price. 74 Rather, according to the Court, the
plaintiffs had to allege that they suffered an actual "economic loss"75 proximately
caused by the defendant's misrepresentation. 76 Post-Dura, because an event study
can show the true value of the stock, event study analysis has been used to demonstrate both that the economic loss occurred and that this loss was proximately caused
by the defendant's misrepresentation.? In other words, an event study is used to
show the requisite causal link between the defendant's misstatement or omission and
the plaintiffs' suffered loss.
Damages. In addition, to make a viable securities fraud claim, plaintiffs
must establish damages.7 8 The primary measure of damages in a securities fraud action is the plaintiffs' out-of-pocket losses.79 It is the difference between the amount
the plaintiffs would have paid and the "true value" of the stock.80 That measure is
calculated by the actual difference between the price at which the plaintiffs actually
invested and the price at which they would have invested had the truth been known
at the time of the transaction.81 The hypothetical amount that the plaintiffs would
have paid or received had the truth been known ("true value") is typically provided
through an expert opinion and event study.82 Experts employ event studies to arrive
at the "true value."83 Event studies answer, "what would the price of the stock have

72
73

74

Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981).
Garber v. Legg Mason, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 597, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 342-43. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of a un-

animous court. Id. at 337.
75 The term "economic loss" however does not appear in the PSLRA as an element of
loss causation.
76 DuraPharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 343.
77 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, Loss Causation,in EXPERT WITNESSES: SECURITIES CASES, §1:26
(Thomson/West 2008).
78 Courts do not hesitate to dismiss a claim where the plaintiff fails to prove damages. See, e.g., Law v. Medco Research, Inc., 113 F.3d 781, 786-87 (7th Cir. 1997); Bass v. Janney
Montgomery Scott, Inc., 152 F. App'x 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2005).
79 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
80 Eisenberg, supra note 67, at 1302.
81 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, The PSLRA's Damages Formula and Experts, in 26 SECURITIES
LITIGATION: DAMAGES § 3:14.50 (Thomson/West 2008).
82
MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, Damages, in EXPERT WITNESSEs: SECURITES CASES, § 1:27

(Thomson/West 2008).
83
An event study looks to how the price of the stock changed after the fraud was
disclosed, but only as evidence of the amount by which it was inflated prior to disclosure. Al-

len, supra note 27, at 956. The "true value" concept is derived from Judge Sneed of the United
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been during the class period but for the fraudulent behavior?" 84 Federal district
courts often rely on expert testimony in computing damages.85
As the next Part demonstrates, each of these elements -materiality, reliance,
loss causation, and damages -depends on a showing of post-disclosure price movement. Stated differently, the stock price must change in response to the disclosure of
the fraud. An adequate demonstration of post-disclosure price movement as a result
of the defendant's fraud in turn depends on the plaintiffs' ability to put forth an
event study that can link this post-disclosure price movement to the fraud.
III. The Essential Elements of Securities Fraud Claims Require Post-Disclosure
Price Movement.
Since the Supreme Court's Dura decision in 2005, the key inquiry for securities fraud actions- particularly those dependent on the fraud-on-the-market presumption-is the amount by which the stock declined as a result of the market becoming aware of the alleged fraud. 86 Securities fraud plaintiffs must show a change
in the value of their investment caused by the defendant's fraud. Event studies serve
to link the subsequent stock price movement to the alleged fraud. Primarily, as this
Part shows, the elements of materiality, reliance, loss causation, and damages all depend on an initial showing of post-disclosure price movement.8 7
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a concurring opinion in Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., where Judge Sneed stated that the best way to measure the loss proximately
caused by the defendant's fraudulent conduct is to create a chart containing a "price line" and
a "value line.," and then subtracting the true value of the stock on the date of purchase from
the price actually paid. In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1346-47 (N.D. Cal.
1994); Jay W. Eisenhofer et al., Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation:Toward
a CorporateFinance-Based Theory of Loss Causation,59 Bus. LAW. 1419, 1425 (2004).
Allen, supra note 27, at 956. See generally Jeffrey M. Goldman, Avoiding Blurred
84
Lines: The Computation of Damages in Rule l0b-5 Securities Class Action Lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit and a Proposalfor a More Sensible System, 2 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 261 (2006).
85 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, Expert Testimony, 26 SEcURITIES LITIGATION DAMAGES § 24:7
(Thomson/West 2007); see, e.g., In re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d
1005, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 2003); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1993); see also
Allen, supranote 27, at 957-65 (discussing computing share price inflation using event studies).
86 Eisenberg, supra note 67, at 1300 (citing Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474,
478-79 (4th Cir. 2006)); see also Thorsen, supra note 12 ("In the immediate aftermath, courts
started focusing on the nature and extent of 'corrective disclosures,' with an emphasis on the nature, size, and immediacy of stock price drops.") (emphasis added).
A corrective disclosure is an admission by the company that one or more of its
87
previous statements were false or misleading followed by a corrected, truthful, and complete
version of those statements. In re Vivendi Univ., S.A. Sec. Litig., 605 F. Supp. 2d 586, 598
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). The federal courts currently disagree over the extent to which this corrective
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A.

Materiality and Post-Disclosure Price Movement.
If the plaintiffs invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption and, in turn, the
efficient market hypothesis, materiality can be proven by showing a post-transaction
stock price decline.88 In fact, "market impact" was once the dominant method of establishing materiality. 89 A court "committed to the efficient market hypothesis" will
deem information material if, once the information is disclosed, there is posttransaction price movement. 90 For example, in In re Merck & Co., the plaintiffs
brought a securities fraud class action against Merck Co. and its officers claiming that
the company and its officers made material misstatements and omissions in registration statements for Merck's subsidiary spin-off's initial public offering ("IPO").91
Merck planned to spin off Medco Health Solutions Inc. ("Medco") in a 2002 IPO.92
The plaintiffs alleged that Medco had been engaging in improper accounting practices which were not disclosed until after Merck filed an amended registration statement with the SEC. 93 The plaintiffs claimed that Merck and Medco had made misleading statements concerning the independence of Merck and Medco's IPO in
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. 94
In examining whether the alleged misstatements by the defendants were material and thus actionable, the Third Circuit stated that materiality is the "first step"
for securities fraud plaintiffs.95 According to the Third Circuit:
Our Court ... has one of the clearest commitments to the efficient market hypothesis.... [T]he materiality of disclosed information may be measured post hoc by looking to the movement in the

disclosure must "reveal" the fraud. Some courts require that a corrective disclosure identify
which prior representation is being corrected. See, e.g., In re Dell Sec. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 877,
907-08 (W.D. Tex. 2008); In re Odyssey Health Care Inc. Sec. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 880 n.4
(N.D. Tex. 2005). Other courts permit a corrective disclosure to be more indirect, including
downwards earnings guidance by the company, reporting of financial statements in public filings, newspaper articles, announcements by a short-seller, and even in the form of a credit ratings downgrade. Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market
Based Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals,36 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (2008); see also In re Vivendi
Univ., S.A. Sec. Litig., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 598.
88 Arnold S. Jacobs, Objective Definitionof Materiality - An Analysis of the Tests - Anticipated Change, in MARKET PRICE, in DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURmES LAWS §

12:34 (2009).
89 Jacobs, supranote 88, at § 12:34.

90 In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2005).
91 Id. at 263-64.
92

Id. at 264.

93
94

Id.

Id.
Id. at 268. Specifically, the Third Circuit stated that establishing materiality is the
first stepfor a Section 10(b) claim. Id. (emphasis added). Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5's concept
of materiality, however, is the same throughout the various securities regulations. THOMAS
LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 284 n.3 (5th ed. 2005).
95
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period immediately following disclosure of the price of the firm's
stock. 96
Thus, information is material if its revelation causes post-disclosure price
movement. Applying this standard, the Third Circuit held that even though Merck's
stock dropped eventually, it was not within the period immediately following disclosure. Therefore, the information, as it resulted in no stock price movement immediately following disclosure, was immaterial.97 The Third Circuit's Merck decision
illustrates the general approach to assessing materiality. 98

B. Reliance in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases.
Similarly, reliance in fraud-on-the-market cases can also be shown with posttransaction price movement. The Fifth Circuit in Oscar Private Equity Investments v.
Allegiance Telecom, Inc. has required post-transaction price movement for both reliance and loss causation. 9 The Fifth Circuit held that a showing of movement in
price is a prerequisiteto reliance in fraud-on-the-market cases. 100
In Oscar, Allegiance Telecom Inc. ("Allegiance") was a publicly traded, national telecommunications company. 101 In April 2001, Allegiance released its financial results for the first three quarters which indicated that Allegiance had outperformed analysts' estimates, raising the stock price. 102 Then in February 2002,

96

In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d at 269 (internal citations and quotations omit-

ted).
97 Id. at 269-70.
98 See, e.g., In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989);
Steiner v. Medquist, Inc., No. 04-5487 OBS), 2006 WL 2827740, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006); In re
Home Health Corp. of Am. Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV A. 98-834, 1999 WL 78057, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 29. 1999); In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., No. 96 CIV 5567, 1998 WL 276177, at *7 n.10
(S.D.N.Y. May 29, 1998); Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 369 (E.D. Pa. 1997);
Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp. 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1306 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Jaroslewicz v. Engelhard Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1296, 1305 (D.N.J. 1989); see also David Tabak &
Marcia Kramer Mayer, Making Assessments About Materiality Less Subjective Through the Use of
ContentAnalysis, PLI Order No. 11072, at 693 (Sept. 2007).
9 Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007).
100 Id. The Oscar decision has been heavily criticized, see Rudman, supra note 1, at 3
(stating that Oscar is in direct conflict with controlling Supreme Court precedent and erroneously creates a new certification requirement by placing a burden on plaintiffs to prove the
merits of their case before trial), but it has been recently reaffirmed by the Fifth Circuit. Alaska
Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) and Fener
v. Operating Eng'rs Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund, 579 F.3d 401, 412 (5th Cir. 2009).
101 Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 262.
102 Id. at 263.
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Allegiance released its fourth-quarter financial results which fell short of analysts'
earnings estimates, thereby restating its total installed-cable line count by over
100,000 lines.103 The stock price fell twenty-eight percent.'1 Oscar Private Equity Investments filed suit in federal court alleging that Allegiance violated Section 10(b)
and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.105 The plaintiffs alleged that Allegiance fraudulently misrepresented its line-installation count in
its first three quarterly announcements in 2001.106 As a result, the plaintiffs asserted
that they purchased Allegiance shares at an artificially inflated price. 07 When Allegiance corrected its line count, the plaintiffs alleged they were injured because of the
resulting stock decline.108 The plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all individuals
who purchased Allegiance's shares between its first- and fourth-quarter releases. 09
The district court certified the class, specifically allowing the plaintiffs to establish a
rebuttable, class-wide presumption of reliance through the fraud-on-the-market
theory.210
The Fifth Circuit vacated the proposed class "for wont of any showing that
the market reacted to the corrective disclosure""' and insisted that class certification
be supported by a showing of loss causation.112 The Fifth Circuit required more than
proof of a material misstatement for the plaintiffs to invoke the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance; rather the court required that the plaintiffs show that the
misstatement actually move the market." 3 According to the court, plaintiffs must initially establish loss causation to trigger the-fraud-on-the-market presumption.114

103

Id. Not only had Allegiance restated its installed-line count, it missed analysts'

earnings per share expectations, and announced greater losses than analysts expected. Id. Al-

legiance missed its revenue covenants which put its credit lines in default, ultimately forcing
Allegiance into bankruptcy. Id.
Id.
Id. at 262.
106 Id. at 263.
107 Id.
10s Id.
104

105

109
110

Id.

Id.

Id. at 262. The dissent characterized the majority's holding as a "breathtaking revision of securities class action procedure that eviscerates Basic's fraud-on-the-market presumption, creates a split from other circuits by requiring mini-trials on the merits of cases at
the class certification stage, and effectively overrules legitimately binding circuit precedent."
Id. at 272 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 262.
n3 Id. at 265 (emphasis in original); but see In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig.,
544 F.3d 474, 483 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting this "actually moved" language).
"4
Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 265, 269. The Oscar decision erroneously
11

conflates reliance and loss causation. As Professor Michael J. Kaufman has noted, reliance is
independent of loss causation. Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, The Supreme Court and
Causation under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 1, 37 (2005). Professor Kaufman
states:
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The court required: (1) that the misstatement actually move the market to prove loss
causation; (2) that only when loss causation is established will the plaintiffs be entitled to the fraud-on-the-market presumption; (3) the plaintiff must establish this by
a preponderance of the evidence; and (4) all this must be done on a motion for class
certification.115
The court required that the plaintiffs show post-transaction price movement
this early in the litigation because "[ilts 'proof' is drawn from public data and public
filings.. .. It is largely an empirical judgment that can be made [at class certification]
as well as later in the litigation." 116 Ultimately, after weighing all the evidenceexpert reports both for and against the plaintiffs -the court decided that the factual
conclusion drawn by the plaintiffs' expert that linked the defendant's fraud to the
stock price movement was "untenable," and because the plaintiffs had not established loss causation, the plaintiff class could not show reliance by way of the fraudon-the-market theory. 117

[RIeliance - even in a fraud-on-the-market case - is distinct from
the element of loss causation. The Court in Basic declared that plaintiffs
must also demonstrate the requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiff's injury. The causal connection
required is that the defendants' misstatements or omissions created a quantifiable disparity between the transaction price and the true value of the securities on the date of the transaction. That particular causal connection can be
broken by defendants by showing that the market price would not have
been affected by their misrepresentations. Reliance requires proof that defendants' misrepresentations or omissions influenced plaintiff's' decision
whether to invest at all. As developed by the Supreme Court in Basic, and
as ultimately codified by Congress in the PSLRA, loss causation is proof that
these misrepresentations or omissions created a measurable difference be-

tween the price which plaintiffs actually paid for their securities and the
price that they would have paid in the absence of those misrepresentations
or omissions.
Id. at 38. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
115
Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 266. The Fifth Circuit's Oscar decision is

evidence of the unjustified judicial creation of Rule 23 trials in securities fraud litigation. See
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creationof Rule 23 Trials in
Securities FraudLitigation, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 331-34 (2010).
116
OscarPrivate Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 266.
117 Id. at 270. The majority found the evidence to be little more than well-informed
speculation. Id. at 271. The plaintiff's expert, according to the majority, offered only raw opinion of the defendant's expert's analysis without a supporting study of the market at issue. Id.
The dissent characterized the court's review as de novo, as opposed to abuse of discretion, and
thus improper. Id. at 272 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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Loss Causation and Damages.118
Loss causation, originally a judge-made requirement,' 19 was codified by
Congress in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"): "In any private
action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that
the act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for
which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages."120 Oscar illustrates that'both loss causation and reliance in some cases depend on a proper showing of stock price movement linked to the defendant's fraud. The Oscar decision is quite mainstream in that
respect; the federal courts generally require post-disclosure price movement linked
to the defendant's fraud to establish essential elements such as loss causation and
even damages. For example, in 2005, the Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals
stated that an inflated purchase price will not itself cause economic loss.121 After Dura, the federal courts interpreted this to mean that establishing loss causation and
damages require that the plaintiff show post-transaction price movement.122 For instance, a post-Dura decision from the Fourth Circuit, Glaser v. Enzo Biochem Inc., held
that to adequately allege securities fraud, the plaintiffs must show that a corrective
disclosure preceded a decline in the defendant's stock price. 23 In Glaser, the plaintiffs brought a common law fraud claim against Enzo Biochem Inc., a publicly traded
C.

11S
"Causation and damage rules are intertwined." Dane A. Holbrook, Measuring
and Limiting Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: Optimizing Loss Causation and Damages in Securities

FraudLitigation, 39 TEx. J. Bus. 215, 226 (2003). Addressing the loss causation issue necessarily

includes addressing the measure of damages in a Rule 10b-5 suit. Id.
Generally, securities damages must be proven with expert testimony coupled with a
valid event study. Compare Freeland v. Iridium World Commc'ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59
(D.D.C. 2008) (stating damages are an element of securities fraud that plaintiffs must prove only by expert testimony) and In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (requiring expert testimony to establish damages) and In re Warner Commc'ns Sec. Litig., 618 F.
Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) and In re Gen. Instrument Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 423 (E.D. Pa.
2001) with Wortley v. Camplin, 333 F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that while expert testimony
may be helpful, it is not required in every category of federal securities fraud case). "Many
courts have found an event study is necessary for proof of damages in a securities fraud
claim." TABAK, supra note 46, at 694; Holbrook, supra note 118, at 233-34.
19 See In re Moody's Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
120 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
121 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (Breyer, J.).
122 Michael J. Kaufman, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation, 26A SEC. LMG. DAMAGES
§24:2:60 (Thomson/West 2009) (citing cases stating that loss causation requires posttransaction price movement); see also Metzler Invs. GMBH, v. Corinthian Coll., Inc., 540 F.3d
1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008); McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.2d 418, 426 (3d Cir. 2007); In re
Impax Labs., Sec. Litig., No. C 04-04802, 2008 WL 1766943, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2008). Even
before the Dura decision securities cases . . . addressing the concept of 'loss causation' . . . de-

viated from the basic principles of corporate finance. In particular certain courts and commentators have concluded that a stock drop following the disclosure of fraudulent activity is essential to establish loss causation, and hence, is a sine qua non for a plaintiff to prevail on the
merits and ultimately recover damages. Eisenhofer, supra note 83, at 1425.
123 Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 2006).
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biotechnology company doing research and development of treatments for HIV.124
The plaintiffs alleged Enzo exaggerated the success of its HIV therapies through
press releases and statements made by its officers. 25 The district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' common law fraud claim holding that they failed to adequately allege loss
causation.126
On appeal the Fourth Circuit interpreted Dura and held that the Supreme
Court required that fraudulent conduct cause post-transaction price movement to establish loss causation.127 The Fourth Circuit stated:
It is only after the fraudulent conduct is disclosed to the investing public, followed by a drop in value of the stock, that the ...
investor has suffered a "loss" that is actionable after the Supreme
Court's decision in Dura. In other words, so long as the fraud is undisclosed, normal fluctuations in price attendant to any market may
have a direct effect on the value of the investor's portfolio, but cannot be said to be a "loss" that is actionable under the federal securities law ...128
Applying Dura, the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to plead loss
causation because they did not link any corrective disclosure to a subsequent drop in
the stock price.129 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that this result was required by Dura
and employed the following hypothetical:
Assume an investor purchased 100 shares of Enzo for $12
per share on January 12, 2000, after the alleged misrepresentations
were made. If the market had known the truth .. . instead of trading
for $12 per share, the stock would have traded for only $1 per share.
Plaintiffs in this case would have stopped the analysis there,
contending that, on the very day of purchase, the investor has suffered a loss of $1,100 - the difference between the price paid ($1,200)
and the price that would have been paid ($100) had the true facts been
known. This analysis ignores the fact that the true facts are not yet

124
125

Id. at 476.
The plaintiffs alleged Enzo exaggerated or made misstatements about its pre-

clinical and clinical trials, its stealth vector, and its patent estate among other things. Id.
126
127
128

Id.
Id.
Glaser, 464 F.3d at 479; see also Catogas v. Cyberonics, Inc., 292 F. App'x 311, 316

(5th Cir. 2008) (holding plaintiffs failed to establish loss causation where even though state-

ments revealed fraud and thus constituted corrective disclosures, the statements did not significantly effect the stock price).
129 Glaser, 464 F.3d at 479.
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known and the hypothetical investor has not yet suffered a loss.
If the stock later drops, as a result of normal market fluctuations, to $6 per share (again assuming the fraud has not yet been disclosed), then the investor owns stock worth only one-half of what
was paid for it. If he sells at this point, he has lost $600 of his initial
$1,200 investment, to be sure, but this loss was not caused by the
fraudulent conduct, because, under the hypothetical, the market is
still unaware of the misrepresentations. 30
Glaser illustrates the general approach to loss causation. The Seventh Circuit
likewise requires post-transaction price movement to establish loss causation and
damages.131 For example, in Ray v. Citigroup Global Markets, the plaintiffs, a group
of more than 100 retail investors, bought millions of dollars worth of stock in SmartServe Online ("SSOL") between 2000 and 2002.132 SSOL was a small company in
the wireless data business. 33 The value of its shares went from $1 to $170 per share
from October 1999 to February 2000, and settled between $70 and $90 per share in
April 2000.'3 Spatz, a stockbroker employed by Citigroup, worked with retail brokers who directly advised the plaintiffs to buy SSOL stock. 35
The plaintiffs alleged that Spatz fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to buy everincreasing amounts of SSOL stock during a general market decline because SSOL had signed
substantial contracts with large corporations that would produce millions of dollars in revenue. 36 What Spatz did not disclose, however, was that SSOL had problems with its current
contracts with other large companies. 37 The plaintiffs argued that Spatz's statements lured
them into thinking that Citigroup genuinely believed that SSOL was a safe investment and
that there was little risk. 138 Later, SSOL disclosed in public filings that it had yet to derive
any significant revenue from its wireless data business.1 39 After the truth emerged, the stock
price, which was more than $80 in June 2000, plunged to only about $1 per share.140 SSOL's
competitors' share values likewise dropped.141
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, citing Durafor the proposi130

Id. at 478-79.

13 Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2007).
133

Id. at 992-93
Id. at 993.

134

Id.

'35

Id. Citigroup is a global financial services firm. Id.

132

Such corporations included Microsoft, Swisscom, Qualcomm, Verizon Wireless,
IBM, and Citigroup. Ray, 482 F.3d at 993.
'37
SSOL had problems with its contracts with GoAmerica, Hutchison, Telecom, and
Sunday Telecommunications. Id.
136

138

Id.

139

Id.

140

Id.
141 Id.
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tion that the loss causation element was missing because plaintiffs had no evidence
to show that the misrepresentations had a causal connection to the loss. 142 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court holding that the plaintiffs did not plead loss
causation.143 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit laid out three ways that plaintiffs could
establish loss causation:
The first is sometimes called the "materialization of risk
standard.". . . requiring the plaintiff to prove that it was the very
facts about which the defendant lied which caused his injuries. The
second approach is the "fraud-on-the-market" scenario,. . . [whereby] plaintiffs must show both that the defendants' alleged misrepresentations artificially inflated the price of the stock and that the value of the stock declined once the market learned of the deception.
Finally ... loss causation might be shown if a broker falsely assures
the plaintiff that a particular investment is "risk-free." 144
The Seventh Circuit dismissed the materialization of the risk standard because no evidence existed to support a jury's conclusion that the drop in value of the
stock was because of the alleged misrepresentations.145 Rather, the court noted that
the defendants introduced expert testimony claiming that the company lost its value
because of market forces rather than fraud.146 According to the Seventh Circuit, the
plaintiffs did not rebut this evidence.147 In addition, the Seventh Circuit dismissed
the fraud-on-the-market theory because the stock had already collapsed by the time
the market discovered the alleged misrepresentations. 148 In essence, loss causation
required a post-transaction decline.149 Thus, without this post-transaction price de-

Id. at 994.
Id.
144 Id. at 995 (internal quotations and citations omitted and emphasis added). However, the Court left open the possibility that "risk-free" assurances may no longer survive Dura. Id. at 996. The lower federal courts have since adhered to Ray's three ways to allege loss
causation. See In re Northfield Labs., Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 06-C-1493, 2008 WL 4372743, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2008).
145 Ray, 482 F.3d at 995.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148
Id. at 995-96. Last, the court dismissed the "risk free" concept because statements
like "it was a certain money winner" made "against a backdrop of public available information
suggesting that ... [it was] a volatile stock," do not amount to assertions that the stock was risk
free. Id. at 996.
149
See also Robbins v. Koger Properties, 116 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the plaintiffs failed to establish loss causation where there was disclosure after the stock price
already declined); In re Wamaco Group Sec. Litig., 288 F. Supp. 2d 307, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
142
143

HeinOnline -- 15 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 207 2009-2010

Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance

208

Vol l5:1

cline, the plaintiffs could not connect that stock decline to the defendant's fraud.
IV. A Proper Event Study is an Essential Element: The Only Way to Show Price
Movement Caused by Disclosure is Through an Event Study.
As shown above, in fraud-on-the-market cases in particular, for securities
fraud plaintiffs to recover, they must show post-disclosure movement of the defendant company's stock price.150 The essential elements of a securities fraud claimmateriality, reliance, loss causation, and damages -all require that the fraud result in
some post-disclosure price movement.1 51 Not only do courts require this postdisclosure price movement, the federal courts have held that the only way to link
price movement to the defendant's fraud is through an event study analysis. 152 Thus,
a proper event study is now a necessary element in a securities fraud claim. As this
Section shows, absent a proper event study, a securities fraud plaintiff has little
chance of success. To illustrate the critical importance of an event study in securities
litigation, this Part will explore two recent decisions: Fener v. Operating Engineers
from the Fifth Circuit, which illustrates that absent a reliable event study a plaintiff
class will not be certified, and In re Williams from the Tenth Circuit, which illustrates
that a court will grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants if the plaintiffs
fail to offer an adequate event study. 153

A. An Event Study is Necessary to Connect Post-Disclosure Price Movement to
the Fraud.
It is common practice for the federal courts to admit expert testimony based
on an appropriate event study, but to exclude testimony based on infirm event studies.'54 In In re Seagate Technologies II, the federal district court granted summary

(holding the same).
15o Eckstein v. Balcor Film Invs., 58 F.3d 1162, 1170 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Seagate Tech.
I Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1357 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp.
1471, 1479 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Alon Bray & J.B. Heaton, Market Indeterminacy, 28 J. CORP. L. 517,
536 (2003) (stating that courts often dismiss cases where the plaintiff fails to offer an event
study).
151 See supra Part III.
152 See Fisher, supra note 38, at 881 (2005) (citing numerous courts that have denied
plaintiffs' experts because of failure to conduct or produce an event study).

See infra Part IV.B and Part IV.C.
Nicholas I. Crew et al., Federal Securities Acts and Areas of Expert Analysis, in § 18
LmGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL EXPERT 18 (Roman L. Weil et al.,
153

154

2007). Compare In re Executive Telecard Ltd., Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(refusing to admit expert testimony in securities litigation because expert failed to conduct an
event study) with Freeland v. Iridium World Commc'ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 87-88 (D.D.C.
2008) (denying summary judgment to the defendant as to loss causation and damages where
the plaintiff offered an expert who conducted an event study analyzing abnormal return and
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judgment for the defendant where the defendant's expert armed with an event study
was unopposed by the plaintiffs with an expert armed with an event study of his
own. 155 Another federal court stated that, "[the plaintiff's] expert's testimony would
be accorded no weight in [the] securities fraud action ... where [the] expert did not
perform an event study or similar analysis ... and did not challenge [the] event
study performed by the [defendant's] expert."156 One commentator has noted that
even materiality depends on an event study.157 Likewise, where the plaintiff fails to
offer an expert with a proper event study as to market efficiency, the plaintiff will not
be able to invoke the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance. 58 In addition, the federal courts require an event study to establish loss causation and damages.159 The
Fifth Circuit in Oscar and Fener flatly stated that proof that a culpable disclosure
moved the market (loss causation) should take the form of an event study.160 The ab-

other indicators f efficient markets).
155 In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1994). A problem with this approach, however, is that the relative resources of the parties in a given case
could determine whose expert event study prevails. Cf. Samuel W. Buell, Reforming Punishment of FinancialReporting Fraud, 28 CARDOZo L. REV. 1611, 1633 (2007).
156 In re N. Telecom Ltd. Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
157 Dunbar & Heller, supra note 55, at 468 (citing cases); see also DeMarco v. Lehman
Bros., 222 F.R.D. 243, 247-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying class certification because the plaintiff's
expert's conclusion on the materiality of a securities analyst's recommendations were 'facially
unreliable' and 'plainly irrelevant' in the absence of an event study); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 652 (2003)
(event studies are used to determine whether a statement or omission was material).
158 Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 307, 310-11 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Ray
v. Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2007) ("There is no evidence from the
record from which a jury could conclude that the drop in the value of the ... shares was attributable somehow to . . . [the] alleged misrepresentations. The defendants introduced expert
evidence that SSOL lost its value because of market forces, and the plaintiffs have offered
nothing to rebut that theory - no expert testimony suggesting that the collapse was caused by
the lack of the fraudulently promised contracts .... ).
159
Dunbar & Heller, supra note 55, at 469-71; see also Oscar Private Equity Invs. v.
Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 265 n.22 (5th Cir. 2007); Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 81
("[D]amages are an element of a securities fraud claim which Plaintiffs must prove, and that
can be done only by expert testimony."); Behrens v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 542
(S.D. Fla. 1988) ("[Plroof of damages in a securities fraud case is always difficult and requires
expert testimony."); In re Warner Commc'ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("[E]xpert testimony would be needed to fix not only the amount, but existence, of actual
damages.").
See Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 265 n.22; Fener v. Operating Eng'rs
160

Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund, 579 F.3d 401, 409 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit
stopped short of insisting on only event studies to establish loss causation. OscarPrivate Equity
Invs., 487 at 271. The Fener court was not so ambiguous however: "Although analyst reports
and stock prices are helpful in any inquiry, the testimony of an expert - along with some kind
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sence of an event study for damages, in particular, will often result in summary
judgment in favor of the defendant.161 "[D]amages are an element of a securities
fraud claim which plaintiffs must prove, and that can be done only by expert testimony."1 62 Damages calculations require expert testimony accompanied with a reliable
event study because to determine damages under the securities laws, the plaintiffs
must distinguish between fraud-related and non-fraud-related influences on the
stock's price.'63 "Over the years many courts in shareholder class actions have required that an expert's analysis of the effect of information be in the form of an event
study or a similar analysis where possible."164
To illustrate the effect of failing to include an event study, consider the following federal district court's statement:
[T]he Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there were
other events at the pertinent time - the third and fourth quarters of
1998 - which might have influenced the drop in stock prices,. . . specifically the Russian default, the Asian crisis and the Long Term Capital default, and that these external events resulted in dramatic
changes in interest rates, thereby affecting participants in the credit
industry.... These are market events for which Defendants cannot
be held responsible. However, absent an event study or similar analysis,
Plaintiffs cannot eliminate that portion of the price decline ... which is
unrelated to the alleged wrong.... The Court therefore excludes [the
expert report].. . on the ground that its methodology is flawed.165
The absence of an event study allows the court to take judicial noticemeaning the defendant does not have to produce any evidence-of other existing
market conditions and reject the expert's testimony as flawed. An event study links
the fraud to the claimed loss and rules out other factors of the decline. Thus, per the
federal courts, an expert armed with a reliable event study has become an indispensable element of securities fraud claims.

of analytical research or event study - is required to show loss causation." Fener, 579 F.3d at
409.
161 See Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (granting summary judgment for defendants
where plaintiffs sought to establish damages based on lay opinion evidence).
162 Id. (citing Behrens v. Wometco Enters. Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 542 (S.D. Fla. 1988)).
163 In re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (C.D. Cal.
2003); see also In re N. Telecom Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Execu-

tive Telecard, Ltd., Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 1021, 1024-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Eisenhofer, supra note 83, at 1426; Stout, supra
note 151, at 652 (stating event studies are necessary to determine damages)..
164 TABAK, supra note 46, at 693. "The actual effect of each false statement on a stock's
price, as it fluctuated to incorporate new information within its efficient market, is often tested
by an 'event study."' Fisher, supra note 38, at 847.
165 In re Imperial Credit Indus., 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1015-16 (emphasis added).
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B.

Class Certification: The Fener v. Operating Engineers Example.
Fener v. Operating Engineers illustrates that absent an event study that rules
out other causes of a stock price decline, a court will deny class certification to the

plaintiff class.166 In Fener, the plaintiffs filed a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 action
against Belo Corporation, a media company that owned the Dallas Morning News.1 67
The plaintiffs alleged that Belo inflated the Dallas Morning News' record circulation,
rigged its audits, and implemented a no-return policy to inflate profits. 6 s In March
2004, Belo announced that the Dallas Morning News' future circulation would be
down. 169 Then, in August 2004, after the market closed, Belo issued a press release
stating that Belo (1) admitted an internal investigation had revealed questionable circulation practices, (2) recognized that the disclosure was coupled with the March 9th
reduction announcement, and (3) recognized that the disclosure was coupled with an
industry-wide decline in newspaper circulation.170 When the market opened the next
day, Belo's stock dropped from $23.21 to $18.00 and finished the day at $21.55.171
"Several securities analysts lowered their earning estimates for Belo and downgraded its stock."172
1. Dueling Experts.
Originally, the plaintiffs submitted no expert testimony with their class certification motion, only excerpts from Belo's SEC Form 10-K for two years, Belo's historical stock prices, Belo's SEC S-3 forms from 1996-2006, financial data from Yahoo!
Finance, and a chart of Belo's daily share price.173 The defendants then responded
with expert testimony and an event study that suggested the stock price decline was
primarily related to the non-fraudulent disclosures in the press release relating to the
March 9th announcement and the industry-wide decline.174 The plaintiffs responded
with expert testimony from Dr. Scott Hakala who conducted an event study and attributed much of the decline to the revelation of the fraud.175 Specifically, the plainFener v. Operating Eng'rs Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund, 579 F.3d 401,
166
409-10 (5th Cir. 2009).
167
Id. at 404. Revenue from the Dallas Morning News makes up about 60% of Belo's
publishing revenue and 30% of its total revenue. Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 405.
17'
Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 408.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 408-09.
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tiffs' expert concluded that the press release could not be separated into three separate disclosures, and even still, the market had already absorbed the non-fraudulent
disclosures' information. 176
The district court denied class certification and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.'"
The Fifth Circuit first stated that the plaintiffs' original motion without any expert
testimony or event study was insufficient to show that the fraudulent disclosure
caused a reduction in Belo's stock.178 According to the Fifth Circuit, "[a]lthough analyst reports and stock prices are helpful in any inquiry, the testimony of an expert-

along with some kind of analytical research or event study -is requiredto show loss causation."1 79 Then, the court rejected the plaintiffs' expert's conclusion that the press release constituted a single corrective disclosure, not three distinct disclosures; rather,
the Fifth Circuit accepted the defendant's expert's version. 80 The Fifth Circuit stated:
Even considering the plaintiffs' analyst commentary and
stock price information together with Hakala's testimony and event
study, the motion for class certification still falls short. As the district court correctly held, Hakala's testimony was fatally flawed; he
wedded himself to the idea that the press release was only one piece
of news and conducted his event study based on that belief. We reject any event study that shows only how a stock reacted to the entire bundle of negative information, rather than examining the evidence linking the culpable disclosure to the stock-price movement.
Because Hakala based his study on that incorrect assumption, it cannot be used to support a finding of loss causation. 81
Once the court disregarded the event study as flawed, the court then stated
that the plaintiffs' expert's testimony alone was insufficient to prove loss causation.182

176

Id. at 409.

177 Id. at 408..
178
179

Id. at 409.

182

Id.

Id. at 409-10 (citing Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487
F.3d 261, 271 (5th Cir. 2007)).
180 Id. at 409. The Fifth Circuit stated:
By its plain language, the press release consists of three separate
pieces of information, and - contrary to plaintiffs [sic] and Hakala's belief [the defendant's expert] did not invent the three-part classification. The
press release first discusses the fraudulent 'overstatement' and the estimated
'decline in circulation related to this matter.' It then recognizes that the disclosure is 'coupled with' the earlier reduction announcement and the 'anticipated lower circulation' over a six-month period. Thus, the release divides
the news into fraudulent and non-fraudulent information related to possible
future circulation declines.
Id.
18
Id. at 410-11 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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2. The Procedural Posture: Class Certification.
Absent a demonstration of loss causation common to the class, the Fifth Circuit refused to certify the class.183 The Fifth Circuit was particularly concerned that
"Class certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle. .. " and
that "[tihe risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even when
the probability of an adverse judgment is low." 84 The Fifth Circuit then observed
that securities class certification resembles "a shake-down or judicial blackmail."185
Thus, without a reliable event study, the plaintiffs could not certify a class.
C.

Summary Judgment: The In re Williams Example.
A recent decision from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, In re Williams Securities Litigation, illustrates that a reliable event study is necessary to connect posttransaction stock movement to the defendant's fraud; absent an event study, a court
will grant summary judgment for the defendant. 8 6 In Williams, a class of investors
that purchased stock or notes issued by Williams Communications Group (WCG)
brought a securities fraud class action alleging violations of Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5.1 87 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the defendant because the plaintiffs' offered expert failed to conduct a "reliable" event study. 88
1. The Rise and Fall of WCG: Fraudulent Spin-Offs?
Williams Companies, Inc. ("WMB") was an energy company that produced
and transported natural gas.'89 As part of its business operations, WMB owned a
large network of pipelines.190 WMB transformed its decommissioned pipelines into a
telecommunications subsidiary that later became known as WCG.191

183

Id. at 411.

184
185

Id. at 406.
Id.

In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1132. The plaintiffs also brought an action under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1230 (N.D. Okla. 2007). Under Section 20(a), or commonly referred to as "controlling person liability," every person who
directly or indirectly controls any liable person under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 is jointly and
severally liable to the same extent as the controlled person. 15 U.S.C. § 78t.
188 In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1132.
189 Id.
186
187

190
191

Id.

Id. Originally, Williams formed WilTel I in 1985, but sold this subsidiary in 1995

and entered into a temporary non-compete agreement preventing Williams from reentering
the telecommunications industry until 1998. Id. After this non-compete agreement expired,
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When WCG was formed in 1998, the NASDAQ U.S. Telecommunications Index ("Telecom Index") ended at 306.60, a forty-two percent increase from the previous year.192 In 1999, the Telecom Index reached 616.80.193 At this time, WCG conducted an IPO to raise capital for expansion.194 The WCG 1999 IPO offered shares of
common stock and high yield notes.195 In March of 2000, WCG's share price peaked
at $61.81 and the Telecom Index likewise peaked at 1248.06.196 The amount raised
from the IPO however, proved to be insufficient. When WCG updated its internal
capital expenditure plans, it showed that capital expenditures would be almost a billion dollars higher than the previous year.197
By July 2000, WCG's stock price declined, falling more than fifty percent.198
During this same period, the Telecom Index fell by twenty-eight. 99 At the end of July, WMB announced that it would spin-off WCG and make it a stand-alone company. 200 The plaintiffs alleged that WMB, WCG, and other corporate officers misrepresented the reasons for the spin-off, the prospects for WCG's survival, and the
adequacy of WCG's capitalization. 201 For example, WMB issued a press release stating that the goal of the spin-off was to ensure effective and efficient access to capital
to fuel growth, but private internal discussions within the WMB board indicated that
WCG's growing capital needs were a drain on WMB's balance sheet.202 The "gap"
between the public representations and internal assessments continued until and after the spin-off in April 2001.203
Then, in January 2002, WMB issued a press release announcing that it would
delay its 2001 earnings report pending an assessment of WMB's contingent obliga-

Williams formed a new subsidiary using the decommissioned pipelines known as WCG. Id.
192 Id. The Telecom Index was at 215.71 at the beginning of 1997. Id. At the end of
1998, the Telecom Index closed at 500.91, an increase of sixty-three percent. In re Williams Sec.
Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
193 In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1133.
194 Id.
195 In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
196 In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1133.
197 In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1206-07.
198
In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1133. By July 21, 2000, WCG's stock price
was at $29.38. Id.
199 Id.
20
Id. The stock price dropped by 2.98% after the announcement. In re Williams Sec.
Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1211.
201 In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1133.

202 Id. One of the defendant CEO's told shareholders that WCG was strongly positioned for success with sufficient financial resources and that WCG was pre-funded for its capital needs. Id. Other senior executives stated the spin-off better enabled each company to execute is business plain and optimized access to capital. Id. Internally however, officers

warned that WCG was underfunded and that it would have to sell non-core assets. Id.
203

Id.
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tions with respect to WCG. 204 Also that day, one of WCG's competitors wrote down
$3.2 billion worth of assets, another competitor announced bankruptcy, and the
plaintiffs' law firm of Milberg WeiSS205 filed suit against WCG. 206 WCG's stock fell
from $1.63 to $1.34.207 In February 2002, WCG announced to its lenders that it may
default; the stock price fell from $1.42 to $1.00.208 WCG then announced that it was
considering Chapter 11 bankruptcy; the stock price fell to $0.22.209 At the end of
210
April 2002, WCG filed for bankruptcy; its stock bottomed out at $0.06 a share.
The plaintiffs brought a securities fraud class action under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 claiming that the defendants' statements painted a rosy view of WCG's
future prospects when in reality, they were directly contrary to the situation: the reason for the spin-off was because WCG's future was in doubt. 211 The plaintiffs thus
claimed that WCG's stock and note prices were artificially inflated.
2. The Plaintiffs' Expert and His Theories of Loss.
The plaintiffs offered expert testimony to link the stock price movement to
the alleged fraud. 212 The defendants challenged the plaintiffs' expert with respect to
materiality, market efficiency (reliance), loss causation, and damages. 213 But the district court found it necessary to only address the defendants' challenges relating to
loss causation. 214 The plaintiffs' expert presented two scenarios in an attempt to
demonstrate that the price decline was attributable (or linked) to the fraud: (1) a leakage theory; and (2) a corrective disclosure theory. 215 But because the plaintiffs could
not produce an event study to the satisfaction of the court that linked the posttransaction price movement to the fraud, the Tenth Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs

Id. at 1134.
The law firm of Milberg Weiss was recently embroiled in a kickback scandal
where the infamous plaintiffs' firm is accused of "paid to play" tactics. Peter Elkind, Milberg
available
at
2007),
(Oct.
3,
CnnMoney.com
the
Music,
Faces
Weiss
http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/01/news/companies/Melvynweiss.fortune/index.htm.
206 In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1134.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. The plaintiffs' expert was retained to provide expert opinions on market efficiency, loss causation, materiality, and damages. In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at
1252.
213 In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1253.
214 Id.
215 In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1134.
204
205
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as a matter of law and granted summary judgment to the defendant. 216
a.Scenario 1: The Leakage Theory.
First, in Scenario 1, the expert employed a leakage theory, which posited that
the fraud was not revealed by a single corrective disclosure, but rather by a leakage
of WCG's true financial condition during the class period. 217 In other words, losses
were caused by the materialization of concealed risks. 218 Under Scenario 1, the plaintiffs' expert attributed ninety-eight-percent of WCG's value to fraud and claimed that
almost the entire stock price decline was the result of the gradual revelation of this
truth to the market.219
The district court rejected Scenario 1 for two reasons: (1) the expert failed to
remove market and industry effects on the value of WCG stock and notes; and (2) the
expert had not identified specific public disclosures that revealed the fraud. 220 The
district court emphasized that there must be a showing of post-transaction price
movement,221 and that not only was an event study required, but that it had to link
the culpable disclosure to the fraud rather than merely demonstrate that the stock
reacted to an entire bundle of negative information.m
The Tenth Circuit agreed. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a leakage
theory in itself does not run afoul of the Supreme Court's Dura decision.? Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit required that the plaintiffs identify the ways in which the
truth was revealed and how the market responded:
To satisfy the requirements of Dura ... any theory - even a
leakage theory that posits a gradual exposure of the fraud rather
than a full and immediate disclosure - will have to show some mechanism for how the truth was revealed.... A plaintiff cannot simply state that the market had learned the truth by a certain date, and
216

217
218

Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1138.

Id. The Seventh Circuit has recognized this as a viable method of establishing
loss causation. Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 995 (7th Cir. 2007).
219

In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1135.

220

Id. The defendants' expert, Dr. David Tabak of NERA Economic Consulting, re-

butted the plaintiffs' expert by arguing that the methods employed by the plaintiffs' expert
failed to properly account for differences between fraud-related and other influences on the
stock price.
NERA Expert's Role in In re Williams Securities Litigation, 1 (2009),

www.nera.com.
221
In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 ("In a case (such as the case at
bar) that presupposed an efficient market, as fraud-on-the-market cases must do ... the showing of causation which must be made ... is a showing that the fraud premium was removed
from the price of the stock by way of the efficient market's reaction to a corrective disclosure
that was responsive to the misstatement or omission that created the fraud premium in the
first instance.").
22 Id.
M In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1138.
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because the learning was a gradual process, attribute all prior losses
to the revelation of the fraud. The inability to point to a single corrective disclosure does not relieve the plaintiff of showing how the
truth was revealed; he cannot say 'Well the market must have
known.' 224
More specifically, the Tenth Circuit rejected Scenario 1 because the expert
failed to segregate the effects of company-specific and market- or industry-specific
news, thus linking the fraud to the post-transaction decline.225 The Tenth Circuit
then intimated that had the plaintiffs offered a reliable event study, the result would
have been different, stating:
WCG's share price fell from $28.50 to $1.63 during that period, and while [the plaintiffs expert] could not explain how the
market learned of the fraud over that year-and-a-half, he claimed
that the decline must have resulted from its revelation and not from
the 'tangle of factors' that affect a company's stock price - despite the
fact that the same period witnessed the bankruptcies of WCG competitors, a decline in the telecommunications industry as a whole,
and the overall market declines that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 226
The Tenth Circuit thus warned that the failure to show a causal connection
between the fraud and the loss would turn the securities laws into "just the sort of
broad insurance against market losses that Dura rejected."227

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. ("The majority of these allegedly corrective disclosures ... were actually either
news that was generally applicable to the telecommunications industry as a whole, or was an
upbeat rather than negative statement about WCG."). The Tenth Circuit stated:
While the truth could be revealed by the actual materialization of
the concealed risk rather than by a public disclosure that the risk exists, see
Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) (loss can be
caused by "materialization of the concealed risk"), any theory of loss causation would still have to identify when the materialization occurred and link
it to a corresponding loss.
Id. But see RMED Int'l v. Sloan's Supermarkets, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5587, 2000 WL
310352, at *6-*8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2000) (permitting leakage theory even in the absence of an
event study because the company's entire trading history was tainted by fraud).
226 In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1139.
227 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
224
225
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b.Scenario 2: The Corrective Disclosure Theory.
The plaintiffs' expert's alternative second scenario ("Scenario 2"), fared no
better. Under Scenario 2, the expert conducted a regression analysis, or event study,
to connect the decline in value to four separate disclosures.M These disclosures
were: (1) WMB's announcement that it was assessing its contingent obligations related to WGC; (2) WCG's informing lenders of the possibility of default; (3) WCG's
statement that it was considering bankruptcy protection; and (4) WCG's announcement of bankruptcy. 229 The district court likewise rejected Scenario 2 because it failed
to distinguish between declines attributable to disclosures of fraud and non-fraud related effects. 230 The district court stated that even though the plaintiffs' expert supported his testimony with a regression analysis, the testimony was unreliable because the expert failed to connect the alleged corrective disclosures to a specific price
drop. 231 The Tenth Circuit likewise rejected Scenario 2 reasoning that the plaintiffs'
expert failed to connect the price decline to any of the four disclosures. 232

c.The Notes and the Absent Regression Analysis.
The district court's treatment of the plaintiffs' expert's event studies regarding the fraudulent notes is most telling. The plaintiffs' expert conducted an event
study with respect to the sale of notes issued by WCG. Yet the district court flatly refused the plaintiffs' expert's testimony "because what [the plaintiffs' expert] calls an
event study does not even purport to differentiate between forces related to the fraud
and those not related to the fraud." 233 The district court stated, "[The expert] simply
did not perform an event study with respect to the notes, and no assertion that 'yes,
he found that note prices dropped on the disclosure dates can change that fact."234
The district court aptly summarized its holding stating "[w]hat is required is an
event study.. . ."235 The issue surrounding the notes was not addressed by the Tenth
Circuit.

3.The Procedural Posture: Summary Judgment.
Because the plaintiffs failed to offer a reliable event study (or an event study
at all, with respect to the notes), the district court granted summary judgment in fa-

228

Id. at 1139-40.

229

Id. at 1139.

230

Id. at 1136. The district court's analysis for Scenario 2, applies with equal force to

the expert's "Scenario 2-alternative." In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
231 In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1269 n.53.
232 In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1136.
233 In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
234 Id. at 1274.
235 Id.
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vor of all defendants.23 6 In other words, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs could not
prevail. The Tenth Circuit affirmed this decision. According to the Tenth Circuit, the
plaintiffs had to link post-disclosure price movement to the defendant's fraud
through an event study that sufficiently ruled out all other factors.237
As Williams demonstrates, because event studies can isolate the effect of each
false announcement on the stock's price, the federal courts have held that event studies are a necessary device to prove loss causation, materiality, reliance or market efficiency, and damages.238 Absent a reliable event study, a securities plaintiff's claim
will likely fail.
C.

An Adequate Event Study May be Necessary and Sufficient.
Nevertheless, while the absence of an event study is generally fatal to a
plaintiff's securities fraud claim, the presence of one may serve to satisfy essential
elements of securities fraud actions.239 For instance, in In re Flag Telecom, the court

found an expert's testimony admissible as to loss causation. 240 Using the testimony,
the court traced when the expert employed an event study, identified material
events, analyzed possible market indices and the most comparable companies in the
specific industry, and used an integrated regression analysis to ultimately measure
the effect of each event. 241 Additionally, a reliable event study can establish that a
market was efficient and thus serve to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption
of reliance that is usually vital to certifying a class.242 To invoke the fraud-on-themarket presumption of reliance, the plaintiff must establish that the market was 'efficient.' 243 To establish an efficient market, the plaintiff must meet certain factors, 244

236

237

Id. at 1275-76.
In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1137.

238

Fisher, supra note 38, at 847.

239

In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd., Sec. Litig., 245 F.R.D. 147, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

Id. at 169.
Id.
242 In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503 (1st Cir. 2005).
243 In re DVI Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 209 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
244
To establish the fraud-on-the-market presumption, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the market is efficient. Ten factors are relevant in determining whether a market is
efficient: whether the securities are (1) traded on a public exchange; (2) had large trading volumes; (3) were followed by market analysts; (4) had several market makers; (5) could be registered on SEC Form S-3; and (6) responded quickly to the release of company-specific information. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286-87 (D.N.J. 1989). Additionally, courts assess:
(7) the size of market capitalization; (8) size of the public float for the stock; (9) the ability to
short sell the stock; and (10) the level of autocorrelation. Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467,
477-78 (N.D. Tex. 2001); see also In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 276-77
240
241
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one of which is that the unexpected corporate events or financial releases caused an
immediate response in the price of the security. 245 With the demonstration of the
causal relationship, a court will easily presume that the market integrated the released information into its price.246 According to the Second Circuit, "[aln event
study that correlates the disclosures of unanticipated, material information about a
security with corresponding fluctuations in price has been considered prima facie
evidence of the existence of such a causal relationship." 247 In addition, some courts
hold by rote that if the plaintiffs offer an expert who conducts an event study as to
market efficiency, the plaintiffs will have fulfilled the market efficiency requirement.248
V. The Event Study Requirement Is Inconsistent With the Seventh Amendment.
As shown above, the federal courts have made an event study an essential
element of a securities fraud claim because they may serve to link subsequent price
movement to the defendant's fraud. This event study requirement, however, is incompatible with the right of securities fraud plaintiffs to a trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment. A plaintiff seeking monetary damages under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws is entitled to a jury trial.249 The event study
requirement infringes on the Seventh Amendment jury trial right in two significant
ways: (1) requiring an event study to establish essential elements of a securities fraud
case removes quintessential factual determinations from the jury; and (2) the event
study requirement allows the judge to usurp the jury's power to assess otherwise reliable expert analyses in reaching its factual determinations. These problems are
compounded by the fact that event studies are not perfect science. As this Section
shows, the results of event studies are malleable to a large degree and thus, the results must be assessed by the factfinder and cannot be the basis for a determination
as a matter of law.

(D. Mass. 2006).
245
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, 546 F.3d 196, 207
(2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). This has been deemed the "essence of an efficient market and
the foundation for the fraud-on-the-market theory." Id. (citing Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1287).
246
247

Id.
Id. at 207-08 (citing In re Excelera.com, 430 F.3d at 512-14, 516); see also In re DVI

Inc., 249 F.R.D. at 196 (certifying a class based on the fraud-on-the-market presumption as the
plaintiff offered expert testimony as to the efficiency of the market); In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.,
No. 04 MD 1653 (LAK), 2008 WL 3895539, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008) (holding same); In re
Nature's Sunshine Prods. Sec. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 656, 664 (D. Utah 2008).
248
In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 266, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Xcelera.com,
430 F.3d at 503.
Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 876 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984),
249
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932.
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A. Materiality, Reliance, Loss Causation, and Damages Are Quintessential Fact
Questions.
Absent an event study, courts refuse to put a securities fraud case before a
jury. 250 In essence, prohibiting a jury, absent an event study, from finding materiality, loss causation, or even damages, removes these factual determinations from the
jury. Without an event study, a jury will never hear, nor decide these issues. This
violates securities plaintiffs' right to have quintessential fact questions determined by
the jury.
The Seventh Amendment provides that in suits at common law, the right to a
trial by jury shall be preserved. 251 The right to a jury trial is not absolute.252 Current
Supreme Court Seventh Amendment jurisprudence requires only the preservation of
the substance of the English common law jury trial as it existed in 1791.253 In the Eng-

250
251

See supra Part IV.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VII; see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &

Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 459-60 (1977). The Seventh Amendment ensures citizenship by preserving an active role for citizens in the administration of both civil and criminal justice. CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS, 113 (2004). "Jury trials give a continuing place to ordinary people in designing the content of law - especially when the stakes are
very high." Id. Interestingly, the Seventh Amendment, through its invocation of "the common
law," is the only part of the Constitution that explicitly through the text requires the application of originalism. Suja A. Thomas, The Unconstitutionalityof Summary Judgment: A Status Report, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1613, 1616 (2008) [hereinafter Thomas, Summary Judgment: A Status Report]. Our nations' founders and the states themselves were firmly committed to trial by jury.
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTIUmON 233-42, 329-30 (2005). Jury trials protect litigants from oppressive judges. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1667, 1680 (2008) [hereinafter
Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Still Unconstitutional:A Reply].
252
The Seventh Amendment does not create a right, but rather preserves the right to
a trial by jury as it existed under the common-law in 1791. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary
Judgment is Unconstitutional,93 VA. L. REv. 139, 146 (2007) [hereinafter Thomas, Summary Judg-

ment]. Traditionally, equity matters were not afforded a jury trial, but legal matters were. Par-

sons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433 (1830); see also Chevron v. Oubre, 93 F.R.D. 622, 623 (M.D. La.
1982) (holding an action to cancel a mineral lease is equitable and not subject to trial by jury).

Rule 10b-5 claims are governed by the Seventh Amendment. See Tellabs v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 327 (2007).
253 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (Souter, J.). The

Supreme Court has described the Seventh Amendment inquiry as a two step process:
[W]e ask, first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action that
either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to
one that was. . . . If the action in question belongs in the law category, we
then ask whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to
preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
See also Suja A. Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modem Procedure, and the EngHeinOnline -- 15 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 221 2009-2010
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lish common law, juries decided only questions of fact and not questions of law.3
Therefore, at present, questions of fact are reserved for the jury, not the court.255 ISsues of materiality, reliance and market efficiency, loss causation, and damages are
quintessential fact questions for a jury to resolve. When the federal courts deny securities plaintiffs the opportunity to put their case before a jury because of the absence of an event study, the court invades the jury's exclusive role to determine quintessential fact questions.

1. A Jury Must Resolve Factual Determinations of Materiality, Reliance,
Loss Causation, and Damages.
Materiality, reliance, loss causation, and damages are quintessential fact
questions that must be resolved by the factfinder. The Supreme Court has consistently indicated that the jury function in securities litigation deserves more than flippant
consideration. In TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., where the Supreme Court defined
materiality,256 the Court stated that materiality could only be determined as a matter
of law when the facts were not in dispute or no different inferences could be drawn
from undisputed facts.257 The TSC Court recognized that "the issue of materiality
may be characterized as a mixed question of law and fact, involving as it does the application of a legal standard to a particular set of facts." 258 But the Court qualified
this broad pronouncement and delineated when materiality may be subject to summary judgment: "In considering whether summary judgment on the issue is appropriate, we must bear in mind that the underlying objective facts, which will often be
free from dispute, are merely the starting point for the ultimate determination of materiality." 259 Thus, a decision regarding materiality as a matter of law is only appropriate when the facts are undisputed. The Court reasoned that this is because "[t]he determination requires delicate assessments of the inferences a 'reasonable shareholder'
would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him,
and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact." 260 The Supreme Court
affirmed this position in Basic v. Levinson, stating that courts would do well to recog-

lish Common Law, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 687, 700 (2004) [hereinafter Thomas, The Seventh
Amendment, Modem Procedure].
254 Thomas, Summary Judgment, supranote 252, at 578.
255

In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920) ("[U]ltimate determination of issues of fact

by the jury [should] not [be] interfered with."); Walker v. New Mexico, 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897)
(issues of fact in common-law actions are to be settled by the jury).
256 TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (Marshall, J.).
Id. at 450.
258 Id. (emphasis added).
259 Id. (emphasis added).
260 Id.; see also SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1466-67 (2d Cir. 1996).
257

HeinOnline -- 15 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 222 2009-2010

Fall 2009

Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role Of Event
Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation

223

nize that materiality is inherently fact-specific and that courts should refrain from
confining materiality to a formula or a specific fact or occurrence. 261 Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, the jury ought to determine whether the subject fraud
is material -whether the information altered the total mix of information available to
investors in such a way as to affect their investment decisions 262-even if the plaintiff
fails to offer an event study.
Similarly, the Supreme Court unequivocally stated in Basic v. Levinson that
market efficiency or the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance is an issue to be
determined by a jury.263 Requiring plaintiffs to rule out other factors that may affect
an efficient market is irreconcilable with Supreme Court precedent. The Court in Basic definitively established that the fraud-on-the-market presumption is rebuttable
only at trial. 264 The Supreme Court stated:
[I]f, despite petitioners' allegedly fraudulent attempt to manipulate market price, news of the merger discussions credibly entered the market and dissipated the effects of the misstatements,
those who traded Basic shares after the corrective statements would
have no direct or indirect connection with the fraud.
... We note there may be a certain incongruity between the
assumption that Basic shares are traded on a well-developed, efficient, and information-hungry market, and the allegation that such a
market could remain misinformed, and its valuation of Basic shares
depressed .. . on the basis of the three public statements. Proofof that
sort is a matter for trial, throughout which the District Court retains
the authority to amend the certification order as may be appropriate.265
This statement implies that the defendant's burden of rebuttal to show that
the market price was not affected by the misrepresentation is a matter for trial.2 6 In
other words, a defense of "non-reliance," or market inefficiency, should not be de261
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (rejecting a bright-line rule that
information concerning merger discussions is immaterial as a matter of law). "Whether mer-

. [A] factger discussions in any particular case are material therefore depends on the facts...
finder will need to look to indicia of interest in the transaction at the highest corporate levels."
Id. at 239.
262 Dunbar & Heller, supra note 55, at 468.
263 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added).
264 Id.
265 Id. at 248-49, 249 n.29.
266 Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1368 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Micron Techs., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 247 F.R.D. 627, 634 (D. Idaho 2007) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 249 n.29).
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termined by the judge. 267
Additionally, the Supreme Court's seminal loss causation decision, Dura
Pharmaceuticalsv. Broudo, is a case about pleadings. 268 While the Dura Court ultimately required a plaintiff to isolate the effect of all other factors and quantify the precise
amount of the fraud with some specificity, Dura did not require the plaintiff to make
this showing with experts armed with event studies at the pleading stage. 269 Neither
did Dura suggest that the failure of a plaintiff's expert to isolate other factors with an
event study is grounds for summary judgment. Rather, it is hornbook law that causation is generally a question of fact for the jury, 270 and Dura recognized this. Dura's
citation to the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests that proximate causation issues
are issues of fact; issues not typically disposed of at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage. 271 Thus, decisions like Williams and Fener usurp the jury's
function to determine fact questions regarding loss causation and market efficiency.
For instance, in Williams, the plaintiffs' expert demonstrated that share prices fell as a
result of fraud. 272 The Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' expert, though, because he
failed to sufficiently rule out other factors. 273 The Fifth Circuit in Fener likewise disregarded the plaintiffs' expert because his event study failed to treat the press release
as three separate disclosures. 274 To the extent other factors might explain this drop in
value, however, they are to be introduced as part of a discrediting process at trial and
not as a basis for dismissing the case at the summary judgment stage. 275
To best illustrate how causation is a classic fact question for the jury, consider the following:
Determining whether [the alleged fraud] is the but-for cause
of [an adverse effect on stock price], then, requires postulating a like267

Rudman, supranote 1.

Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (assessing whether a plaintiff's complaint adequately alleged loss causation).
268

269

J. Robert Brown, Using Loss Causation to Repeal Rule 10b-5: In re Williams Securities

Litigation (Part4), (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.theracetothebottom.org.
270
75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 657 Cause and Effect (2008). If the facts are disputed or if
different inferences can be drawn from undisputed facts, the question of causation is one for
the jury. Id. Proximate cause in particular is more often a question of fact than law. 65A C.J.S.

Negligence § 857 (2008).
271
Scott D. Hakala, Current Economic and Expert Issues in Securities Litigation, at 4,
https://plusweb.org/files/Events/all.star7Econ.%20Issues%20-%2Securities%2OLit.pdf
sited Aug. 11, 2009).
272

(last vi-

In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1253 (N.D. Okla. 2007).

273

In re Williams Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d 1130, 1143 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009).

274

Fener v. Operating Eng'rs Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund, 579 F.3d 401, 409

(5th Cir. 2009).
275
Brown, supra note 269; see also Freeland v. Iridium World Commc'ns, Ltd., 545 F.

Supp. 2d 59, 88 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating that it is not proper for a court to exclude expert testimony because the factual bases for the expert's opinions are weak. Rather, that goes to the credibility of the testimony, making it a cross-examination issue and determination for the jury).
HeinOnline -- 15 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 224 2009-2010

Fall 2009

Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role Of Event
Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation

225

ly course of events and asking whether [the negative effect on stock
prices] would be likely to occur in the absence of [the alleged fraud].
Determining whether [the alleged fraud] is the proximate cause or
legal cause of [the negative stock price effect] requires similar but
more nuanced considerations. The decision maker must decide
whether [the alleged fraud] is sufficiently extraordinary given the
expected course of events to be designated a "cause" rather than a
"condition" of [the negative stock price effect] for purposes of assigning fault. In their focus on the likely course of events, both questions of but-for cause and questions of proximate cause require
probabilistic inferences about hypothetical conditions in the world the events that were most likely to happen given the state of the
world prior to the injury. 276
Because materiality, reliance, and loss causation require probabilistic inferences, they lead to conjectural conclusions about the world, and hence to new knowledge, thus making them fact decisions reserved for the jury. 277 An event study seeks
to determine what would have happened to the stock but-for the alleged fraud. 278
An assessment whether something would occur given some postulated set of circumstances is archetypal, inductive reasoning reserved for the fact-finding jury. 279
2.

Even a "Reasonableness" Standard is an Affront to the Jury's Role.

Even if courts couch the event study requirement as a finding that "no reasonable jury could find these elements absent a reliable event study," it is still an affront to the jury's role. Professor and noted Seventh Amendment scholar Suja A.
Thomas has written extensively on Seventh Amendment implications involving procedural devices such as the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment.280 Her thesis -that both procedural devices as currently practiced are uncons-

Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh
276
Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 1125, 1156-57 (2003). The issue of damages is generally accepted
as a question of fact as well. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532
U.S. 424, 437 (2001) (Stevens, J.) (stating that the measure of actual damages suffered presents a
question of historical or predictive fact); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,
453 (1996) (stating that generally the proper measure of damages is a question of fact); Dimick
v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (recognizing that the measure of damages is a question of
fact).
277 See Kirgis,supra note 276, at 1157.
278 TABAK, supra note 46, at 694.
279 Kirgis, supra note 276, at 1155.
280 See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional,92 MINN. L.
REv. 1851 (2008) [hereinafter Thomas, The Motion to Dismiss]; Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary
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titutional- is steadily gaining ground. 281 Professor Thomas maintains that the modem use of both summary judgment and the motion to dismiss in securities litigation
is unconstitutional.282 According to Thomas, the framework for determining the constitutionality of procedural devices in lieu of Seventh Amendment concerns is as follows: (1) under the common law, only the jury or the parties determine the facts; (2) a
court determines the sufficiency of the evidence only after a jury trial, and even then,
if evidence is believed to be insufficient, the court orders a new trial; and (3) a jury
decides a case with any evidence, however improbable. 283 The hallmark of her thesis
is that the common law only allowed a judge to consider the sufficiency of the evidence after a jury trial and verdict 84 Even a court considering only the reasonableness of inferences drawn from the evidence presented contravenes common law procedures, which require the judge to accept all allegations of the party as true, reregardless of the improbability of those allegations.285
This view of the Seventh Amendment illustrates how the event study requirement is unconstitutional. In In re Williams, for example, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, reasoning that the plaintiffs
"have failed to present evidence suggesting that the declines in price were the result
of the revelation of the truth and not some other factor."28 6 Yet the plaintiffs did in
fact present a great deal of evidence showing the causal link between the pricedecline and the revelation of the truth, including - but not limited to - the analysis of
an expert whose qualifications were beyond challenge.287 Nonetheless, the Tenth
Judgment is Unconstitutional,93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment
is Still Unconstitutional:A Reply to Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1667 (2008); Suja
A. Thomas, The Unconstitutionalityof Summary Judgment: A Status Report, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1613
(2008); Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 767 (2005); Suja A.
Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Common Law, 82 WASH.
UNIv. L. Q. 687 (2004); Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionalityof Remittitur Under the
Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO STATE L. J. 731 (2003).
281 See generally Thomas, Summary Judgment: A Status Report, supra note 251, at 162123.
282 Thomas, Summary Judgment, supra note 252, at 140.
283 Id. at 180. Much of the debate in early nineteenth century focused on the
jury's
power to determine law, not fact, implicitly accepting that the jury was the sole arbiter of fact.
ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL, 53-68 (2009).
284
Thomas, Summary Judgment, supra note 252, at 161. Even then, where a judge

found insufficient evidence, another jury would decide the second case, and not the judge. Id.
Summary judgment was originally enacted with the expectation that it would be available only as a device for resolving commercial disputes relating to liquidated debt claims. BURNS, supra note 283, at 66.
285
Thomas, Summary Judgment, supra note 252, at 159. While one may worry that

such an approach would result in a wave of expensive securities fraud suits going to trial, Section VI.B.2.d explains how additional securities fraud suits will not a fortiori result in higher
settlements or more expensive suits.
286
287

In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d 1130, 1143 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009).
The plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Blaine Nye, has testified as an expert in numerous seHeinOnline -- 15 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 226 2009-2010
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Circuit concluded that the jury should not be entitled to weigh that evidence because
it did not include the judge's own preferred methodology - a statistical regression
analysis. The plaintiffs in Fener likewise presented the defendant company's SEC
Form 10-Ks for two years and SEC S-3 forms for ten years, historical stock price information, financial data, a chart of daily share price, and eventually expert testimony armed with an event study.288 The Fifth Circuit, however, ruled that this evidence
289
According to a
could not establish loss causation and denied class certification.
decide these
must
jury
the
however,
Amendment,
Seventh
proper reading of the
facts. The judge could assess the sufficiency of the evidence only after a jury verdict;
and then the judge could order a new trial. The plaintiffs' expert in Williams offered
evidence on materiality, reliance, loss causation, and damages; the jury should have
assessed that evidence, as improbable as it may have been in the Tenth Circuit's eyes.
B. The Event Study Requirement Allows the Judge to Usurp the Jury's Power to
Assess Otherwise Reliable Expert Analyses in Reaching its Factual
Determinations.
The event study requirement precludes the jury from assessing reliable expert testimony. The judge's decision to preclude the jury from assessing reliable expert testimony regarding factual issues also infringes on the Seventh Amendment by
constituting an impermissible invasion of the jury's factfinding function in two discrete ways: (1) the judge precludes the jury from weighing competing expert opinions; and (2) the judge precludes the jury from discounting the testimony from otherwise reliable experts.
1. The Judge Precludes the Jury from Weighing Competing Expert
Opinions.
An approach similar to Williams and Fener, where the court decides whether

curities fraud actions. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., Sec. Litig., No. 02 CIV.5571 RJH
HBP, 2009 WL 886222 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (superseded by 634 F. Supp. 2d 352); In re Enron
Corp. Sec., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Schwab v. Philip Morris, USA, Inc., 449 F.
Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Worldcom, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 02 CIV. 3288 (DLC), 2005
WL 627720 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2005); In re Physician Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., No. 97-3678-CIV,
2002 WL 34477593 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2002); In re Gen. Instrument Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 423
(E.D. Pa. 2001).
288 Fener v. Operating Eng'rs Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund, 579 F.3d 401, 408
(5th Cir. 2009).
289 Id. at 408-10.
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to believe the expert's testimony and preferences the defendant's expert over the
plaintiff's, constitutes an impermissible invasion of the jury's factfinder function. A
judge only determines whether the expert testimony can assist the trier of fact. 290 The
jury determines which expert, if any, to believe. 291 In In re Williams, the court decided
between two competing experts and found that as a matter of law, the plaintiffs' expert failed to demonstrate loss causation. 292 Similarly, in Oscar, the judged weighed
competing expert reports both for and against the plaintiff, and then the court decided that the factual conclusion drawn by the plaintiff's expert was "untenable." 293
This occurred in Fener as well. 294 But which expert was correct - the plaintiffs' expert
or the defendant's expert - is an issue for the jury, not the judge.295 "The Court's role
is not to determine whether [the expert's] testimony is correct, but rather whether it
falls outside the. range where experts might reasonably differ, and where the jury
must decide among the conflicting views of different experts, even though the evi296
dence is 'shaky.'"
2. The Judge Precludes the Jury from Discounting the Testimony from
Otherwise Reliable Experts.
Second, the jury ultimately decides whether to accept any expert testimony at
all. 297 In In re Williams, the Tenth Circuit usurped the jury's role in evaluating the
plaintiffs' expert opinion because the court dismissed the expert opinion for failure to
include an event study that ruled out the effects of other market factors at the summary judgment stage. 298 This approach raises serious Seventh Amendment concerns.
Whether the expert has ruled out the effects of other factors is a merit assessment that

Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 254 F.R.D. 168, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
See In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d at 1143; NERA Expert's Role in In Re Williams Securities Litigation, 1 (2009), www.nera.com (describing how the defendant's expert
successfully rebutted the plaintiffs' expert at the summary judgment stage).
293 Oscar Private Equity Invs., 487 F.3d at 270.
294 Fener v. Operating Eng'rs Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund, 579 F.3d 401,
408-10 (5th Cir. 2009).
295 See, e.g., City of Mansion Hills v. Sexton, 160 P.3d 812 (Kan. 2007) (stating that the
trier of fact resolves conflicting expert testimony); Miller v. Comm. Contractors Equip., Inc.,
711 N.W.2d 893 (Neb. 2006) (stating same); Salerian v. Maryland State Bd. of Physicians, 932
A.2d 1225 (Md. App. Cat. 2007).
296 Freeland v. Iridium World Commc'ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 88 (D.D.C. 2008).
297 See, e.g., Lange v. Freund, 855 N.E.2d 162 (111. App. Ct. 2006); Med. Review Panel
v. Bernice Comm. Rehab. Hosp., 915 So.2d 254 (La. App. Ct. 2005); Gibson v. Ferguson, 562
S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1976) (stating that the jury decides whether to ultimately accept or reject expert testimony).
298 In re Williams, Sec. Litig., 558 F.3d 1130, 1143 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009).
290
291
292
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should be dealt with on cross-examination and rebuttal. 2W When a court, as the
Tenth Circuit in Williams, requires that the plaintiffs' expert rule out the effects of
other factors, the court usurps the jury's function of determining facts. Professor Miller aptly describes the division between judge and jury with respect to expert witnesses:
[Consider] the case of expert witnesses to fact. What is their
function? It is just this, of judging facts. They are called in because
they are men of skill and can interpret phenomena which other men
cannot, or cannot safely interpret.... It is perfectly well settled in
our law that such opinions or judgments are merely those of a witness, they are to aid the jury or the judge of fact, and not to bind
them; the final judgment is for the jury, and unquestionably, the
judgment is one of fact. 300

The jury assesses the character of the expert, the expert's demeanor on the
witness stand, the weight and process of the expert's reasoning, possible biases of the
expert, and any other issues. In other words, evaluating an expert's testimony concerning issues such as materiality, reliance, loss causation, and damages falls within
the jury's province to listen, weigh, accept, or reject expert testimony.30 Professor
Miller further explains:
[tihere is a significant difference between allowing a judge to
dispose of a case by applying a determinative legal principle to undisputed facts and allowing a judge to decide a factual issue because
he or she believes the evidence allows only one conclusion. A judge
always decides the former. As to the latter, if one or more facts are
in dispute or different inferences may be drawn from undisputed
2
facts, a jury should be allowed to find for either party.30

299
Brown, supra note 269; see also Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 362 F.
Supp. 2d 487, 494 (D. Del. 2005) (stating that whether an expert failed to consider other rele-

vant factors is an issue for cross-examination and goes to the weight afforded to the expert's
opinion).
no Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush to Judgment: Are the 'Litigation Explosion,' 'Liability Crisis,' and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 982, 1104 n.622 (2003) (citing James B. Thayer, 'Law and Fact' in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 147, 154-55 (1890)).
301
See Miller, supra note 300, at 1104.
302 Miller, supra note 300, at 1091-92. Abrogating the Seventh Amendment cannot be
justified for securities class actions on the basis of efficiency and cost because the Seventh
Amendment makes no such allowance; rather the Seventh Amendment gives power to the
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This is the case with materiality, 303 loss causation, reliance, and damages - at
best, different inferences can be drawn from undisputed facts.304
It has been suggested that requiring post-disclosure price movement is necessary because judges and juries cannot be trusted to sort out a misstatement's real
financial fronts.305 As an initial matter, our Constitution's framers and our nation's
founders did not express such distrust of the jury system.30 6 Moreover, by removing
these kinds of cases from the jury's purview we may cause juror ignorance over these
issues to persist.307 Additionally, empirical studies refute the idea that jurors are incapable of grasping the nuances involved in complex cases. For example, empirical
studies have found that there is no correlation between the complexity of a case and
the likelihood of disagreement between a judge and jury as to the outcome.308 Rather, empirical studies demonstrate that the case facts are the most important determinant of jury verdicts. 309 Moreover, to saddle a plaintiff with proving the generally
indeterminable fact of what would have happened but for the omission or misrepresentation that skewed the market value of the stock would reduce the protection
against fraud afforded by Section 10(b).3 10
C.

An Event Study Assists a Trier of Fact; It Does Not Replace It.
An event study must assist the trier of fact in reaching its ultimate conclu31
sion; 1 an event study does not replace the trier of fact as the arbiter of ultimate issues. The jury must assess expert testimony based on an event study for two additional reasons: experts exercise substantial discretion in the process of conducting an
event study which must be subject to the jury's review; and there is no magic talis-

jury that cannot be eliminated by Congress or the courts. Thomas, The Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 280, at 1887.
303 Materiality is generally an issue for the trier of fact. Oxford Asset Mgmt, Ltd. v.
Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2002); Marsh Group v. Prime Retail Inc., 46 F. App'x 140,
1444-45 (4th Cir. 2002).
30
See Freeland v. Iridium World Commc'ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 80 (D.D.C.
2008) (stating that summary judgment is generally inappropriate where an expert's testimony
supports a nonmoving party's case).
305 Patrick J. Coughlin, What's Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? The Plaintiffs' Attorneys Review the Supreme Court's Opinion and Its Import for Securities Fraud Litigation, 37 LoY. U. CI. L.J.

1, 39-40 (2005) (quoting Professor John C. Coffee as stating that securities fraud losses require a
visible market reaction to disclosure because judges and juries cannot be trusted to sort out a
misstatement's real financial effect).
306
307

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

311

FED. R. EvID. 702.

SUNSTEIN, supra note 251, at 113-14 (stating that the Seventh Amendment serves to
educate the public about law and policy).
308 BURNS, supra note 283, at 20.
309 Id. at 21.
310 Du Pont v. Brady, 828 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1987).
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man for what constitutes a correct event study under any given set of circumstances. 312 First, while there are general parameters within which an expert must exercise his discretion, an expert still exercises considerable discretion therein. For instance, the length of an event window can have a substantial effect on the amount of
damages. While a general rule of thumb is that an event window should constitute
three days, a different length does not automatically discredit the results of the event
study.313 A jury must decide whether to accept or reject the expert's discretion in this
regard.
Second, determining a securities fraud action as a matter of law based on the
absence or presence of an event study is flawed because an event study can be exploited in estimating what would have been the effect of the truth had it been told at
the time it was covered up.3 14 Thus, a jury must evaluate an event study and determine whether to accept or reject such expert evidence. For example, Esther Bruegger
and Frederick C. Dunbar of NERA Economic Consulting insightfully demonstrate
how the standard event study in securities litigation is much more limited than is
commonly accepted. 315 At best, according to Bruegger and Dunbar, the event study
is a starting point, rather than a definitive resolution, and in some cases, it is unnecessary altogether.3 16 Bruegger and Dunbar demonstrate that there often comes a
point in event study analysis where arbitrary allocations are made by the experts.317
Bruegger and Dunbar isolate three conditions regarding a studied event that
may affect event study reliability: (1) the presence of confounding information; (2) a
buildup of inflation per share over the class period; and (3) allocating liability to codefendants.318 First, as often occurs, the corrective disclosure which alerts the market
to corporate fraud is contained in a news announcement that also contains material

312

Indeed, even the term "statistically significant" has more than one meaning and

is not a talismanic term. Hakala, supra note 271, at 13 n.21. Some suggest that event studies as
currently performed should be categorically ruled inadmissible by judges on reliability
grounds because error rates are unknown. Jonah Gelbach, Valid Inference in Single-Firm, SingleEvent Studies Used in Scholarship and Securities Litigation: A Research Agenda, 4 (Searle Center on
Law, Reg., and Econ. Growth, Working Paper, Feb. 12, 2009).
313
See Lehocky v. Tidel Techs., Inc., 220 F.R.D. 491, 506-07 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (concluding that plaintiff's expert's event study using a two-day window was sufficient to demonstrate
that a cause and effect relationship between company-specific announcements and stock price
may exist).
314
Esther Bruegger & Frederick C. Dunbar, Estimating FinancialFraud Damages with
Response Coefficients, 35 J.CoRP. L. (forthcoming 2009).
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id.
HeinOnline -- 15 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 231 2009-2010

Stanford Journalof Law, Business & Finance

232

Vol 15:1

information unrelated to the alleged misrepresentation. This was the problem in
Fener.319 Factors other than the revelation of the fraud may simultaneously be affecting the stock price. 320 For instance, a defendant corporation may issue a press release
in which it reveals the prior fraud, but also announces news favorable or unfavorable
to the business wholly unreated to the fraud. Therefore, the presence of confounding information in a studied event may skew reliability; a jury is required to weigh
this evidence.
Next, there is the problem of a buildup of inflation per share. Usually defendants make a series of misrepresentations over time with the consequence that
damages per share are increasing throughout the class period, but the corrective disclosure (or revelation of the truth) is not in a form that each distinct misrepresentation is corrected in an isolated and separate announcement. 321 An event study in this
situation may overestimate or underestimate damages per share depending on
whether confounding factors unrelated to the fraud have positive or negative effects
on the stock price. 322
Last, Bruegger and Dunbar note that in securities fraud cases different sets of
codefendants are alleged to be responsible for different misrepresentations that are
nonetheless revealed altogether in a solitary corrective disclosure.323 According to
Bruegger and Dunbar, an event study is usually of limited value in determining proportionate liability because the event study itself cannot distinguish between which
part of a price decline is due to which defendant's fraud. 324 Thus, a factfinder must
allocate liability and attribute price decline to the respective defendants.
Moreover, A.C. MacKinlay studied the power of the event study and concluded that the accuracy of the event study varies as the number of firms in the sample increase, as the number of days in the event window decrease, and as the alternative of a larger abnormal return is considered against a null hypothesis of zero
abnormal return. 325 For example, MacKinlay finds that in a sample size of twentyfive companies, the probabilities of detecting an abnormal return (or an effect on the

319 Fener v. Operating Eng'rs Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund, 579 F.3d 401,
408-10 (5th Cir. 2009).
320 Bruegger & Dunbar, supra note 314; see also Bhagat & Romano, supra note 11, at
399; Fisher, supra note 38, at 880.
321 This is the essence of the "true financial condition" theory. See In re Dell Sec. Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 877, 911-12 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
322 Bruegger & Dunbar, supra note 314.
323
324

Id.
Id.

325 Bhagat & Romano, supra note 29, at 149 (discussing the MacKinlay study); Hakala, supra note 271, at 10 n.16 ("Event studies can vary in practice, including differences in assumptions and levels of investigation and, consequently, different event studies can result in
significantly different levels of precision.").
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stock price) of 0.5%, 1% and 2% is 24%, 71% and 100% respectively. 326 But if the
sample size is increased to 100 companies, the probabilities of detecting an abnormal
return of 0.5%, 1%, and 2% is 71%, 94%, and 100% respectively. 327 Thus, there is significant difference in detecting an abnormal return, or effect on the stock price, depending on the size of the event study. Similarly, the power of an event study diminishes substantially as the event period is increased by just a single day. 328
As shown, an event study is not perfect science. The adversary process must
be used to mitigate the methodological concerns and gaps identified. Experts employed in litigation should highlight these methodological concerns and the jury
must then assess and weigh such evidence.
VI. The "Event Study" Element is Inconsistent with the Federal Securities Laws.
Apart from the Constitutional infirmities of treating an event study as an essential element of securities fraud claims, the event study requirement is inconsistent
with the plain language of the federal securities laws. It is inconsistent with the language of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), the common law,
and corporate finance theory. Moreover, requiring plaintiffs to produce an event
study itself is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the federal securities laws
as it unjustifiably inhibits meritorious suits, weakening the integrity of our securities
markets.

A. The Federal Securities Laws Do Not Require a Post-Disclosure Decline as a
Precondition to Recovery.
An event study as an essential element in securities fraud claims lacks support in the federal securities laws. Event studies should not be used as a roundabout way to improperly require investors bringing securities fraud claims to prove
that the defendants' misrepresentations or omissions caused a post-transaction decline in the value of their investments. 329 Contrary to the Supreme Court's indication
in Dura, such an approach is inconsistent with the federal securities laws. Moreover,
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") does not require that a plaintiff show that a defendant's conduct caused a post-transaction decline in the value of

326 MacKinlay, A. C., "Event Studies in Economics and Finance," Journalof Economic
LiteratureVol. XXXV, Issue 1 (March 1997).
327 Id.
328 Bhagat & Romano, supranote 29, at 149-50.
329 See Michael J. Kaufman, Loss CausationRevisited, 32 SEC. REG. L.J. 2 (2004).
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the plaintiff's investment.330 This interpretation is required by the plain language of
the statute, references to common law, and basic principles of corporate finance
theory.
1. The Plain Language of the PSLRA Does Not Require A PostTransaction Decline and Event Study.
The PSLRA specifically defines loss as the "loss for which the plaintiff seeks
to recover damages." 331 Under the PSLRA, the plaintiff does not need to establish a
causal link between the wrongdoing and any losses for which the plaintiffs do not
seek to recover damages, let alone an event study establishing this.332 Rather, the
PSLRA has a defined recovery structure. First, under the PSLRA, the plaintiff must
define the precise losses for which the plaintiff seeks damages.33 3 Second, "[a]fter- but
only after- the losses for which [the] plaintiff seeks damages are defined with precision, can a determination be made regarding whether [the] plaintiff can establish a
causal link between the defendants' challenged conduct and the losses."3a The difference between the consideration paid by the plaintiffs and the consideration that
they would have paid had the alleged misrepresentations not been made is a "loss"
recoverable under the PSLRA; these losses are called "out-of-pocket losses."335 For
example, where the plaintiff purchases a security for $100 a share, but would have

330 Kaufman, At a Loss, supra note 114, at 6. This approach is analogous to other provisions contained in the securities laws. For example:
The express antifraud rights of action in the 1933 Act clearly do not
require the plaintiffs to prove that the defendant's conduct caused their investments to decline in value. Section 11 of the 1933 Act expressly allows

acquirers of securities offered pursuant to a registration statement containing a material misstatement or omission to obtain damages from the issuer,
its officer, directors, and professionals. Section 11(e) contains an elaborate
damage formula that allows plaintiffs to recover the difference between the
offering price and either the 'value' of the security at the time of the suit or
the price received if sold before suit.
Kaufman, Loss Causation:Exposing a Fraud on Securities Law Jurisprudence, supra note
71, at 366. However, in Section 11, to the extent that Congress has recognized the concept of
loss causation, it has placed the burden on the defendant to prove the absence of causation. As
one can see, Section 11 does not require the plaintiff to come forward, armed with an expert
and a statistical regression analysis.
331 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
332 Kaufman, At a Loss, supra note 114, at 6. But see Nathaniel Carden, Comment, Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 for Judicial Presumptions of Market
Efficiency, 65 U. CHi. L. REV. 879 (1998) (arguing the PSLRA indicates an essential distrust of the
efficient market hypothesis).
333 Kaufman, At a Loss, supra note 114, at 6.
334 Id. at 7 n.19 (discussing Dura). But see Fry, supra note 87 (arguing that the Supreme Court's Dura decision was consistent with Congressional intent).
335 Kaufman, At a Loss, supra note 114, at 7.
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paid only $60 had the alleged misrepresentation not been made, the $40 difference is
a loss recoverable under the PSLRA.
The plaintiff must establish a causal link to these out-of-pocket losses. Prior
to Dura, the Supreme Court, federal courts, and Congress repeatedly declared that
securities plaintiffs could recover these out-of-pocket losses.33 6 If the plaintiff sought
to recover out-of-pocket losses, the plaintiff needed only to establish a causal connection to this precise loss and the defendant's misrepresentation.337 The plaintiff only
needed to show that the defendant's misrepresentations caused a quantifiable artificiality in the purchase price, calculated as of the purchase date.338 The plaintiff did
not need to establish a causal link to the defendant's misrepresentation and any posttransaction decline in value.339 While a post-transaction decline may serve as evidence
of out-of-pocket losses, the post-transaction decline is not in and of itself an out-ofpocket loss.340
2. The Common Law Distinguishes Between Out-of-Pocket Losses and
Losses Resulting from a Post-Transaction Decline.
This interpretation is also supported by the common law of fraud.341 Under
the common law of fraud, a plaintiff could recover both direct damages and consequential damages.342 Consequential damages are damages the plaintiff seeks in addition to the direct damages from a fraudulent transaction?' 3 Consequential damages
were recoverable if, but only if, the plaintiff can establish that these consequential
336 Id. at 7-8. But see Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (stating
that plaintiffs cannot recover by alleging artificial inflation at the time of purchase).
337
Kaufman, At a Loss, supra note 114, at 8. This interpretation is supported by the
legislative history of the PSLRA and Congressional intent. Id. at 8-21.
338 Id. at 11.
339 Id. But see Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 478-79 (4th Cir. 2006) (arguing that because at the time of the purchase the fraud is not yet known, there is no loss under Virginia common law fraud).
wo Kaufman, Loss CausationRevisited, supranote 329.
341 Kaufman, At a Loss, supra note 114, at 20-21. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
likewise supports this interpretation of the loss causation. Kaufman, Loss Causation:Exposing a
Fraudon Securities Law Jurisprudence,supra note 71, at 381. The Dura Court neglected the common law difference between direct and consequential damages, instead relying solely on the
common law requirement that there be some pecuniary loss. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336, 343-44 (2005). See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud
Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 361-62 (2007) (discussing the confusing common law origins
of securities fraud remedies).
342 Kaufman, At a Loss, supra note 114, at 20.
343 Id. (emphasis added).
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damages are related to the misrepresentation.344 The concept of direct and consequential damages easily translates to securities fraud claims: (1) direct damages consist of the out-of-pocket loss suffered by the plaintiff; and (2) consequential damages
consist of any post-transaction decline in value in the plaintiff's investment." 5 Therefore, under the common law of fraud, the plaintiff could recover his out-of-pocket
loss as a direct damage of the fraud without any showing that the misrepresentation
caused additional consequential damage, or post-transaction decline. 6 For example,
where the plaintiff purchased a security for $100 a share, but would have paid only
$60 but for the misrepresentation, the $40 difference is a loss recoverable under the
PSLRA; they are direct out-of-pocket damages as a result of the defendant's fraud. If
the stock price declines by $10 because of disclosure of the fraud, that additional $10
decline would represent consequential damages.

3. Corporate Finance Theory Dictates that an Event Study Need Not Link
a Post-Transaction Decline to the Defendant's Fraudulent Conduct to
Demonstrate Loss.
Corporate finance theory also dictates that economic loss can occur because
of a purchase of stock at an artificially inflated price?"7 Requiring an event study that
connects fraud to a post-transaction decline relies on an incoherent concept of economic loss because it fails to acknowledge that an investor who purchases securities

at an artificially inflated price and resells those securities has suffered a loss simply
through his initial purchase at the inflated price.

34
34s
346

8

Id.
Id.

Id. Indeed, share price declines are largely disconnected from the true value of
the company. Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal,
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REv. 7, 10, 26-33 (1994) (arguing that market crashesextreme stock price declines-are consequential damages at best, but should never be recoverable, even where there is a sufficient nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's
loss, as it would violate the spirit of the business judgment rule).
347 Kaufman, At a Loss, supra note 114, at 39-40. "Damages in securities class action
litigation has increasingly become based upon principles of corporate finance."
supra note 83.
48

Eisenhofer,

Kaufman, At a Loss, supra note 114, at 39. The Supreme Court however flatly re-

jected this position in Dura, ignoring principles of corporate finance:

For one thing, as a matter of pure logic, at the moment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated purchase
payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant possesses
equivalent value. Moreover, the logical link between the inflated share purchase price and any later economic loss is not invariably strong. Shares are
normally purchased with an eye toward a later sale. But if, say, the purchaser sells the shares quickly before the relevant truth begins to leak out,
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Under basic principles of corporate finance theory, the market price (the transaction price) of a security reflects the market's estimation of the company's future cash flow, discounted to the
present at the company's cost of capital. Where a company falsely
represents its present or past financial performance the market will
use this information as an indicator of the company's future cash
flows. If the purchasers of securities have purchased at a price that
reflects expectations of future cash flow that have been artificially inflated by the defendant's fraud, the purchasers have suffered a recognizable loss. That economic loss is recognizable because the investors have purchased securities at a price which falsely inflated
their expectations of the company's future cash flow. The loss exists
even if there has been no subsequent corrective disclosure of the fraud followed by a decline in price.349
The attorneys who represented the plaintiffs before the Supreme Court in
Dura similarly explain how stock price decline is not a necessary condition for establishing loss causation in fraud-on-the-market cases:
Market valuations are based upon expected future cash
flows discounted by the cost of capital. These cash flows are commonly referred to as discounted cash flows. Open market frauds
commonly manipulate stock market price increases by artificially
raising cash flow expectations. Conversely, cash-flow expectations
just as easily can be lowered to reduce fraud-induced inflation without any overt disclosure of the fraud by defendants issuing further
statements - true or false - that on their face may or may not appear
to be directly related to the original fraud.350
Basic corporate finance principles dictate that a stock price is a reflection of
the market's estimation of the company's future cash flows, discounted back to the

the misrepresentation will not have led to any loss. If the purchaser sells later after the truth makes its way into the marketplace, an initially inflated
purchase price might mean a later loss. But that is far from inevitably so.
When the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a lower price,
that lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed
economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industryspecific or firm-specific facts, conditions or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower price.
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-43 (2005).
349 Kaufman, At a Loss, supra note 114, at 40.
350 Coughlin, supra note 305, at 23.
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present at the company's cost of capital.351 Therefore, a plaintiff investor can suffer a
loss even if the stock never declines below the purchase price or if it declines before
the corrective disclosure.352 "Under sound principles of corporate finance, where expectations of future cash flow have been artificially inflated because of fraud, then
the resulting stock price also is artificially inflated by fraud .... [I]f the plaintiff can
demonstrate that he or she overpaid for the stock as a result of the fraud, and the
price of the stock declined as a result of an explicit (or implicit) disclosure of diminished further cash flow expectations, such a showing would be sufficient . .. even if
the share price decline was prior to any explicit disclosure.. . ."3 There need not be
a post-transaction price drop for a plaintiff to suffer loss: inflating the price at the
time of purchase reduces an investment's expected future rate of return at the time of
purchase, causes an economic loss of the time value of the money associated with the
inflationary purchase, and reduces .the quality of the investment and increases the
risk of loss associated with it.35 Moreover, academic finance literature indicates that
securities prices often incorporate new information before it is formally announced.35 For example, prices may decline on rumors of insider trading before a
formal release and disclosures of varying credibility may gradually become public
throughout a lengthy period.35 6 Scott D. Hakala, often a testifying expert in securities
litigation, lucidly explains how an inflationary loss can occur regardless of the disclosure of bad news:
[S]uppose an investor buys a share of stock for $100 and the
company discloses a significant restatement one month later such
that the share price falls from $100 to $50 on the corrective disclosure. We would all presumably agree that loss causation exists and
the loss is $50 in this simple case. Suppose however, a month after
the corrective disclosure, the company loses a major lawsuit and files
for bankruptcy before the investor sells the share, with the value of

Eisenhofer, supra note 83, at 1442.
Kaufman, Loss Causation Revisited, supra note 329. Stock price reflects the market's estimation of the company's future cash flows, discounted back to the present at the
company's cost of capital. Eisenhofer, supra note 83, at 1421.
351
352

Value = PV cash flows + PV terminal value.

Cash flows = cash flow forecasted during the projection period;
Terminal value = value of the firm at the end of the forecast period;

PV = present value as of the valuation date using the debtor's weighted average cost
of capital as the discount rate.
Id. at 1422.
353
Eisenhofer, supra note 83, at 1420; see also Thorsen, supra note 12 ("Inflationary
loss occurs whenever an investor who paid too much is unable to get that overpayment back
in the marketplace.").
354 Hakala, supra note 271, at 6 n.7.
355 Coughlin, supra note 305, at 25.
6 Coughlin, supra note 305, at 25-26.
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the shares falling to zero. The investor has suffered a $100 investment loss, of which $50 is the inflationary loss in this example.
... However, rearrange the order of the events in this exam-

ple such that the news of the adverse legal decision follows one
month after the purchase of the share and the share price falls to zero
upon the filing of bankruptcy. Then the company discloses a month
after the bankruptcy that it had committed fraud and needed to restate its prior financial reports. Applying the principles underlying
the out-of-pocket theory of loss previously stated, the investor suffered a $100 investment loss and $50 inflationary loss.
. . . Regardless of the timing of the two events following the

fraud-induced inflation in the purchase price, the investor is in identically the same position at the end. Clearly, $50 of the $100 investment loss was solely caused by the fraud, in that, had the fraud not
existed and the transaction still occurred the investor would have
avoided $50 of the $100 loss.357
Regardless of the timing of the disclosure, the investor suffered inflationary
loss.
Thus, requiring an event study that connects a post-transaction decline in
stock price to the alleged fraud to establish a securities fraud claim is unsupported by
the federal securities laws, common law concepts of recoverable loss, and corporate
finance principles of economic loss. A plaintiff can suffer loss even absent a postdisclosure price movement.
B. Requiring an Event Study Imposes an Unjustified Barrier to Meritorious
Securities Fraud Claims.
Besides lacking a textual basis, the event study requirement is inconsistent
with the underlying purposes of the federal securities laws. As evidenced by the Supreme Court's recent Stoneridge decision, a policy justification in securities case law is
exceedingly important.358 Heightened pleading and evidentiary standards in securities laws are premised on the assumption that securities claims are frivolous, inefficient, and abusive359 and that they present an in terrorem threat of settlement.36s In
Hakala, supra note 271, at 7.
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163 (2008); see
also 26 MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, Examining Policy Implications in a Securities Fraud Action, in
35s
358

SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES § 15:7:05 (Thomson/West 2008).
359

The in terrorem criticism has been recognized by the legislature, S.REP. No. 104HeinOnline -- 15 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 239 2009-2010

240

Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance

Vol 15:1

fact, the Supreme Court's Dura decision-the catalyst for the event study requirement-sought to prevent a plaintiff "with a largely groundless claim to simply take
up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in
terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope
that the discovery process will reveal relevant evidence."36' As this Subpart shows,
however, the event study requirement -which is nothing short of a heightened
pleading and evidentiary standard -lacks any legitimate policy objective. Rather, it
inflicts serious harm on meritorious securities fraud actions.
1.The Fictional Underpinnings of the Event Study Requirement.
The event study requirement lacks policy support. The assumed harm
averted by the event study requirement is illusory. The prevention of in terrorem securities fraud settlements is too weak in theory and in fact to justify a heightened
pleading and evidentiary burden. As this Subpart shows, the in terrorem concept is
illogical and concerns about abusive discovery do not warrant an event study requirement.
a. The In Terrorem Concept Is Illogical.
The in terrorem concept suffers from logical deficiencies. To complain that

98, at 4 (1995) as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (discussing the purpose of the PSLRA
was to curb perceived abuses); S. REP. No. 104-98, at 5 (1995) as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
679, 684 (noting the system is being abused and misused); H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995)
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (abusive practices include (1) routine
filing of lawsuits against issuers whenever there is a significant change in the stock price without regard to culpability, (2) targeting deep pocket defendants and individuals covered by insurance, (3) imposing burdensome discovery costs to push a settlement, and (4) class action
manipulation), the Supreme Court, Stoneridge Inv. Partners,552 U.S. at 163-64 (stating securities
fraud actions chill foreign investment); Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 313 (2007) (stating that securities fraud actions impose substantial costs on companies
when employed abusively); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (stating that
securities actions present an in terrorem threat), the federal appellate courts, Higginbotham v.
Baxter Int'l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (distrusting plaintiff's attorneys by implying

they fabricate witnesses); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261,
267 (5th Cir. 2007), and commentators, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURTIES
CLASS ACTION LmGATION: THE PROBLEM, ITS IMPACT, AND THE PATH TO REFORM. (July 2008).
360 See Fener v. Operating Eng'rs Constr. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund, 579 F.3d 401,
406 (5th Cir. 2009); Oscar PrivateEquity Invs., 487 F.3d at 267; Securities Litigation - Class Certification - Fifth Circuit Holds that Plaintiffs Must Prove Loss Causation Before Being Certified as a
Class, 121 HARv. L. REv. 890 (2008) (stating that courts have erected additional barriers to class

certification in securities actions to guard defendants from settling frivolous claims). Despite
the fact that this policy concern is insufficient to justify a rigorous standard, there is a competing policy concern that mandates against a rigorous standard: a rigorous standard can make it
harder for victims to pursue smaller claims absent a class action device. David S. Evans, Class
Certification,the Merits, and Expert Evidence, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2002).
361 Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 347 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)).
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defendants are forced into settlement ignores the well-settled principle that the law
favors settlement of merited claims. 362 Those that presume the frivolity of securities
class actions generally argue that such actions force defendants in terrorem into settlement. If the action is not frivolous, but is merited,363 the defendants' entering into
a settlement is a good thing.36 4 Settlement compensates the injured party, spares both
parties litigation costs, and promotes judicial economy. 365 The main problem with
the in terrorem policy concern is that it is inapplicable where a claim has merit.366
In addition, whether a claim is "frivolous" is an untestable rhetorical asser-

See supra Part V.A.1.a.
Instances of legitimate corporate fraud-as opposed to plaintiff fear mongeringare not unheard of. For example, as Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve
noted that modem corporate accounting practices responsible for the Enron and Worldcom
debacles provided corporate management with broad discretion "to favorably bias their results to the edge of outright fraud. Some clearly went over the line." ALAN GREENSPAN, THE
AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW WORLD 431 (2007); see also BETHANY MCLEAN &
PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE RooM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF
ENRON (2003) (chronicling the massive Enron accounting scandal); Coughlin, supra note 305, at
27-31 (discussing real-world examples of corporate fraud and inflationary loss).
364
Courts recognize that there is a strong judicial policy in favor of settlement, and
362
363

in particular, in the class action context. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank
Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378
(9th Cir. 1995); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982); Piambino v. Bailey, 610
F.2d 1306, 1328 (11th Cir. 1980); In re Blech Sec. Litig., No. 94 CIV. 7696, 2000 WL 661680, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2000); Adair v. Bristol Tech. Sys., Inc., No. 97 CIV. 5874, 1999 WL 1037878, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1999); In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litig., 142 F.R.D. 588, 590
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). "Class action suits readily lend themselves to compromise because of the difficulties of proof, the uncertainties of the outcome, and the typical length of the litigation.
There is a strong public interest in quieting any litigation; this is particularly true in class actions." In re Prudential Sec. Inc. Ltd. P'ships Litig., 163 F.R.D. 200, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
365 Evans, supra note 360, at 3-6; see also In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552
F.3d 305, 309 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 186 n.8 (1974)
(Douglas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow for the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has gone so far as to suggest
that both plaintiffs and defendants should include in their initial pleadings requests for a mediated settlement conference to facilitate settlement. Morton Denlow, Making Full Use of the
Court: Come to Settle First,Litigate Second, 35 A.B.A. LmG. 28, 29 (Fall 2008).
Should defendants and other still be heard to complain of litigation costs where
366
the claim has merit, a very simple, yet often overlooked, response exists: "'Why Not Tell the
Truth?' Justice Brandeis observed that sunlight is a great disinfectant. If we focus on telling the
truth, rather than obfuscating financial results, we can have the best of all worlds: an efficient
market and minimal litigation." Charles W. Murdock, Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Hero or
Villain, 39 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 525, 568-69 (2008). Moreover, "[iun a typical litigation scenario, the
courts merely serve as a background for the bargaining between two parties to reach a settlement. Thus to single out settlements in securities litigation as nuisance-driven ignores the fact
that most litigation is aimed at achieving settlement." John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing Game, 39 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 658 (2007).
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tion insufficient to deny investors a remedy for harmful conduct.367 Proponents of
securities reform claim that securities actions cost millions of dollars in unnecessary
legal expenses, and often are settled without regard to the merits solely to avoid the
expense and risks of defending "frivolous" suits. 368 These claims, however, are based
more on rhetoric than on empirical proof.369 Additionally, there is the logistical problem that there is little substantial means by which to respond to the mantra that 'most
securities class actions have little merit,'370 as defendants require plaintiffs to enter
into strict confidentiality agreements before engaging in document production and to
return or destroy all documents on the closing of a case. 7' Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys
are generally unable to respond to vague public attacks on the validity of securities
fraud suits by pointing to specific evidence of uncovered fraud. 372
b.

Abusive Discovery Concerns Are Insufficient to Justify an
Event Study Analysis.
Hand in hand with the in terrorem criticism is the concern that excessive and
abusive discovery puts a gun to the head of corporate defendants and forces them to
settle regardless of the merit of a claim.373 Yet concerns about expensive securities
class discovery do not warrant an event study requirement on the part of plaintiffs.
As this Section shows, discovery abuse in general is not as rampant as the misperception of its abuse is. Moreover, discovery abuse is a two-way street: both plaintiffs

367 John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and
its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 n.5 (2006).
368
See Evans, supra note 360, at 36 ("Class actions can put a gun to the head of companies. Maybe the company will win, but maybe they will get a verdict that will kill them.");
ROBERT E. LITAN, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THROUGH THEIR EYES:
How FOREIGN INVESTORS VIEW AND REACT TO THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM, 13 (Aug. 2007) (stating that
"some defendants can feel financially pressured to settle even if they have done nothing
wrong, believing it not to be worth betting their companies on a subsequent mistaken jury
verdict that can be difficult to overturn on an appeal.").
369 D. Brian Hufford, DeterringFraud vs. Avoiding the "Strike Suit": Reaching an
Appropriate Balance, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 593, 633 (1995). As John C. Coffee, Jr., securities law expert,
states:
The true 'strike suit' nuisance action, filed only because it was too
expensive to defend, is, in this author's judgment, a beast like the unicorn,

more discussed than directly observed. Although small settlements may
have been impelled in part by the high cost of defense, the corresponding
observation is that the small damages in these cases also did not justify
much effort on the plaintiffs side. Neither side wanted to invest much effort

in them - but this does not make them inherently frivolous. Similarly, the
economic evidence that strike suits predominate also seems unpersuasive.
Coffee, Jr., supra note 367, at 1536 n.5.
370 Hufford, supra note 369, at 637.
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
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and defendants impose costs and use discovery as a pressure tool. Additionally, discovery promotes merits resolution. Finally, and most important, requiring an event
study actually increases securities litigation costs.
i. Discovery Abuse is Misperceived.
First, there is widespread sentiment that discovery is abusive and high discovery costs force defendants to settle. 374 This misperception is particularly acute in
securities class action litigation.375 Empirical research about discovery in civil litigation, however, has yielded results that differ from this conventional wisdom. 376 In
other words, the concern about abusive discovery practices rests on prevailing sentiments that discovery is excessive and abusive rather than on actual hard data.3 7
"Most studies measuring the incidence of discovery survey only opinions, impres-

374
See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 787 (1998) (stating that the debate over discovery reform was based on
salient personal experiences, and not with the benefit of empirical evidence); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences
for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) [hereinafter Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray] (documenting "Faludi-style," the myth of pervasive discovery abuse). However, there is
still no working definition of what constitutes "appropriate" discovery. Linda S. Mullenix, The
Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 688 (1998) [hereinafter Mullenix, The Discovery Abuse Sequel].
375 Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray,supra note 374, at 1398 (citing Jonathan Racuh, The
ParasiteEconomy, 24 NAT'L L.J. 980, 980 (1992) ("Like ticks on hounds, the lawyering and lobbying classes are sucking billions from the economy that might otherwise be used for productive
investment. And the public is getting plenty sore about it.").
376
Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice
under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 527 (1998). The discovery reform
agenda is based on "questionable social science, cosmic anecdote, and pervasive, mediaperpetrated myths." Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray, supra note 374, at 1396 (internal quotations omitted). Discovery data has in fact remained constant over time. Mullenix, The Discovery Abuse Sequel, supra note 374, at 684.
377
Wunderlich, supra note 366, at 655. "Perceptions based on potentially unrepresentative experiences coalesced in a widely shared belief that discovery abuse was a pervasive
and serious phenomena." McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 374, at 787. "Proposals for discovery reform are typically impelled by anecdotal evidence and rhetorical, but highly compelling,
reports of discovery abuse. Mullenix, The Discovery Abuse Sequel, supra note 374, at 684. Similarly, Professor Charles Yablon argues that discovery is misperceived as zealous advocacy.
Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1620
(1996). According to Yablon, this is because of the inherent tension between the cooperative
nature of discovery and the adversarial nature of the litigation system. Id. at 1625. To remedy
this over-zealous discovery advocacy, Professor Yablon suggests that courts treat lawyers
much like a parent treats their kids on long car trips when they act up: tell them to "shut up
and knock it off." Id. at 1619. This approach would have the effect of deterring abusive discovery by making it "less fun." Id. at 1640.
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sions, or billable hours."378 The Columbia Field Project study, the first major study
into the actual effects of discovery practice, found that there was no widespread failing in the scope or availability of discovery.37 9 Likewise, a 1978 study by the Federal
Judicial Center found that in fifty-three percent of cases no discovery was requested
at all, and fewer than five percent of these cases had more than ten discovery requests.380 The Federal Judicial Center study also found that in seventy-two percent
of the cases, there were no more than two discovery requests.38 1 Similarly, a study by
the National Center for State Courts found that only forty-two percent of the cases in
the sample group conducted discovery. 382 Empirical data suggests that a majority of
ordinary cases involve no discovery and that the majority of the cases that do conduct discovery generally involve only two discovery requests. Thus, abusive discovery is not widespread; rather what is widespread is the misperception that discovery is
excessive and abusive.383
Admittedly securities class action litigation suffers, on average, from a higher incidence of discovery.384 But securities class actions alone do not suffer from this
higher incidence of discovery. 385 For example, intellectual property cases, trade regulation claims, tort claims, admiralty claims, contract cases, and antitrust cases all suffer from a higher volume of discovery.38 6 In all larger and more complex cases discovery is used more extensively and intensively and thus consumes a dominant
percentage of litigation resources.387 Thus, more extensive and intensive discovery in

378
Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)"Much Ado About Nothing?", 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 681 (1995) (referencing "[t]he widespread
public and professional perception of a 'litigation explosion"' (citing WALTER K. OLSON, THE
LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAwSurr (1991)). One
such study found that, in terms of time, discovery is what lawyers statistically spend most of
their time on in the course of ordinary litigation. David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary
Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 91 (1983) (surveying a random sample of cases and lawyers
finding lawyers spend about 16.7% of their time on discovery matters).
379 McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 374, at 786-87 (citing the Columbia Project field
survey).
380
Peggy E. Bruggman, Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation: Discovery Reform, PLRI
HASTINGS, Fall 1995, at 1, 12, available at http://w3.uchastings.edu/plri/fal95tex/discov.html.
The Federal Judicial Center study examined 3,000 cases in six United States district courts. Id.
381 McKenna & Wiggins, supranote 374, at 790.
382 Bruggman, supra note 380, at 13.
383 Wunderlich, supranote 366, at 655.
384 Willging, supra note 376, at 578.
385 Kevin LaCroix, Private Securities Litigation: Important Deterrent or Wasteful Churn?,
THE D&O DIARY, Oct. 26, 2008, http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/10/articles/securitieslitigation/private-securities-litigation-important-deterrent-or-wasteful-chun/.
386 Willging, supranote 376, at 552; Wunderlich, supra note 366, at 656.
387 McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 374, at 801. Larger and more complex cases also

are more influenced by tactical decisions.

Id. However, massive amounts of discovery

presents a clichid "chicken-or-the-egg" type problem: "broad discovery can contribute to megalitigation in part by unearthing evidence that supports claims by many." Richard L. Marcus,
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higher stakes litigation may explain any existence of a higher incidence of discovery
abuse.3 88 In higher stakes litigation, there tends to be more involvement in the discovery process, i.e., privileges are invoked more frequently and clients play a more
active role in discovery matters.389 In other words, the higher incidence of discovery
problems in larger class actions does not imply that more problems are likely to occur.390 Instead, a high incidence of discovery problems for larger cases may just indicate that there is plainly more discovery in those cases. 391 And notably, a high incidence of discovery in all complex cases does not justify a heightened pleading or
evidentiary standard for securities class actions alone.
Even if discovery data emerges finding that securities actions abound with
high discovery costs more so than any other complex litigation, high discovery costs
are to be expected in securities class actions which claim millions of dollars in investor losses. Discovery costs are proportional to both parties' needs and the stakes in
the case. 392 One study found, quite intuitively, that the size of monetary stakes in the
case had the strongest relationship to the total litigation costs more so than any other
studied characteristic. 393 Litigation in general, not just securities fraud class actions,
is an interactive investment process, which is influenced by actual and anticipated
expenditures of both the litigant and his opponent. 394 The high costs of securities lit-

Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of Megacases on Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 470 (2001). Thus,
whether a big case generates big discovery or whether big discovery generates a big case is an
issue.
388
See TODD FOSTER ET AL., NERA EcoNOMIC CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN
SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LmGATION: FILINGS STAY LOW AND AVERAGE SETTLEMENTS STAY
REVERSING?
8
(Sept.
2007),
ARE
THESE
TRENDS
HIGH-BUT

http://www.nera.com/image/PUBRecentTrendsSep2007-FINAL_4color.pdf
shareholder class actions in securities as all exceeding $1 billion in 2007).
389 McKenna & Wiggins, supranote 374, at 801.
390 Marcus, supra note 387, at 471 n.60.
391

(listing top ten

Id.

Willging, supra note 376, at 531. Indeed, the likelihood of discovery problems increased as the stakes, factual complexity, and contentiousness increased. Mullenix, The Discovery Abuse Sequel, supra note 374, at 685-86.
393 Willging, supra note 376, at 532. Other factors studied included the percentage of
litigation costs attributable to document production, the number of hours spent in depositions,
the size of the law firm, the complexity and contentiousness of the case, and the type of the
case. Id. High stakes also influenced the length of the litigation: the higher the stakes, the
longer the case lasted. Id. at 533.
394
Trubek, supra note 378, at 76, 77 (discussing the idea that litigation is an investment of scarce resources to achieve a future result); see also Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Ro392

bert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, Loyola University School of Law: So Why do We Call Them
Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1412 (2002) (saying all decisions on whether to go to trial
are based on cost concerns).
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igation are not attributable to frivolous litigation or abusive discovery, but rather this
symbiotic relationship.
ii.

Both Plaintiffs and Defendants Are Prone to
Discovery Abuse.
Second, even if discovery abuse is prevalent, this two-edged criticism does
not justify an event study requirement for plaintiffs alone. Courts have imposed barriers on plaintiffs because of discovery concerns, but "[d]efendant's attorneys (58%)
were more likely than plaintiffs attorneys (42%) to report that they had no problems
[with disclosure or discovery in their case]." 395 Consequently, plaintiffs have more
problems with discovery than defendants. Also, discovery problems come from both
sides. Defendants can assert that plaintiffs will use discovery as a club to impose
costs on defendants just as easily as plaintiffs can assert that defendants use 'dumptruck' and warehouse discovery responses as methods of overwhelming the plaintiffs.396 As one commentator explained:
While companies claim that frivolous litigations result in
unnecessary defense costs, what they fail to acknowledge is that frivolous defenses to valid claims have perhaps an even greater impact
on the costs and delay inherent in litigation. Defense firms universally choose to file substantial motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment, even for cases which clearly satisfy the pleading standards with valid underlying claims. Defense attorneys also oppose
class certification even in the most routine situations and usually attempt to delay or stymie legitimate discovery efforts. As a result,
cases involving even the most obvious frauds take years to litigate
and often result in settlements below what investors should, in all
fairness, receive. In response to the argument that plaintiffs' firms
file frivolous suits in order to 'extort' settlements, it can just as easily
be asserted that defendants delay litigation and file frivolous defenses in order to force plaintiffs to accept low settlements.397
In addition to the fact that discovery abuse is likely to occur on both sides of
the fence, there is some indication that a lengthened discovery process will actually
benefit defendants. For example, studies find that " [d]iscovery is not cost-effective for

39s

Willging, supra note 376, at 553.

396

Marcus, supranote 387, at 470.
Hufford, supra note 369, at 639; see also Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray,supra note

397

374, at 1401-02 ("Corporate defendants withhold necessary evidence or inundate requesting
plaintiffs with thousands of documents (in either instance, imposing extra cost, harassment,
and delay on requesting plaintiffs). When discovery abuse occurs, it seems equally likely to be
an attempt by a corporate defendant to bankrupt a plaintiff and to induce abandonment of the
lawsuit as a plaintiff's attempt to harass a defendant.").
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all parties.... [Flor plaintiffs, increased lawyer time spent on discovery was associated with decreased measures of success.. .. [D]iscovery is less profitable for plaintiffs. The more days plaintiffs spent in recovery, the lower their recovery relative to
expectations." 398
Another interesting paradox with the in terrorem and abusive discovery argument is that discovery studies find that cases with more discovery are actually less
likely to settle.399 The number of days spent in discovery was associated with both
increases in the number of disagreements between sides concerning factual and legal
issues and lower proportions of cases settling before trial. Cases where neither side
engaged in discovery settled out of court in ninety-seven percent of cases. 400 Thus, it
is inconsistent to claim that high discovery costs force defendants to settle when, in
reality, higher incidences of discovery meant the parties were actually less likely to
settle.
iii. Discovery Promotes Merits Resolution.
Third, discovery plays an important role in the litigation drama. There is no
dispute that defendants incur substantial costs defending against securities actions.
But the issue is not whether these defendants would have saved money by avoiding
litigation expenses as they obviously could have. 401 "The real question is whether the
benefits of a system that can adequately deter fraud outweigh the benefits of a system that discourages both frivolous and meritorious fraud suits." 402 "Discovery is
designed to promote resolution of cases on the merits. Neither defendants nor plaintiffs could adequately assess the strength of their own claim or their opponent's claim

398

McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 374, at 795-96 (emphasis added); see also Baker &

Griffith, infra note 406, at 777-78 ("[T]he defendant's higher costs do not necessarily give the
plaintiff an advantage, as defense costs reduce available insurance limits. Assuming that the
claim will settle within insurance limits, this means that increasing defense costs also decreases
the total pot available to plaintiffs in settlement. Thus plaintiffs may also have a strong incentive to avoid high discovery costs.").
399 McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 374, at 796.
400

Id.

Hufford, supra note 369, at 635. Ultimately, whether discovery is 'abusive' or
'wasteful' may just be a matter of perspective: "[F]rom the judge's perspective the lawyers
have wasted a lot of time and energy on useless papers and gotten yelled at in the process. But
from the plaintiff's counsel's perspective, plaintiff's deposition got postponed for at least two
months while lawyers drafted and served new interrogatories and answers, and that obviously felt like a victory, even if it had little impact on the ultimate outcome of the case." Yablon,
supra note 377, at 1622.
402 Hufford, supranote 369, at 636.
401
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absent discovery requests." 403 And neither can the court adequately assess the
strength of the claims absent discovery. Full access to evidence through open discovery ends trial by ambush and promotes settlement. 404 Discovery is designed to
facilitate a resolution on the merits.
iv. The Event Study Requirement Increases Discovery
Costs.
Last, requiring an event study increases securities litigation costs. Expert
discovery is the second most costly type of discovery. 405 If courts require securities
plaintiffs to expend more time and money on the case by procuring event studies,
plaintiffs will require greater settlements to recoup their costs. 406 An event study requirement precludes parties from entering into agreements to forgo costly types of
discovery, such as expert discovery. 407 Additionally, in describing the two main
sources of dissatisfaction with the use of expert witnesses, Judge Posner states that a
battle of the experts creates added costs without any added benefits:
First, because the experts are paid by the respective parties,
it is feared that they are partisans of whoever hired them ("hired
guns") rather than being disinterested, and hence presumptively
truthful, witnesses. This of course does not distinguish them sharply
from a number of other types of witness, notably the parties themselves ... But, second, it is feared that expert witnesses can mislead
judges and juries more readily than lay witnesses can because they
are more difficult to pick apart on cross-examination; they can hide
behind an impenetrable expertise expressed in an unintelligible jargon. A subordinate concern, though closely related to the concern
with intelligibility, is that opposing experts often simply cancel each
other out. The expected outcome is unaffected, and so the use of the
experts creates costs without any benefits. 408

403 Wunderlich, supra note 366, at 658. In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp.
2d 1096 (D. Nev. 1998), provides a good illustration of the difference discovery can make:
Prior to discovery, the plaintiffs' initial complaint was dismissed, but after the benefit of discovery in a bankruptcy proceeding, the court granted leave to amend the complaint. Id.
04
McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 374, at 785-86 ("Full access to the evidence
would end trial by ambush and surprise. Open discovery would promote settlements; with
both sides obliged to turn over all their important cards, secrets would disappear and realistic
negotiations would occur.") (internal citation omitted).
405 Willging, supranote 376, at 540.
406 Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors and Officers' Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 771 (2009). It is generally recommended

that where a case is significant enough, you should often employ two experts: one to testify
and one to consult. Eric T. Chaffin, De-Escalate the Expert Discovery Wars, 44 TRIAL 36, 37 (June

2008).
407
40

See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 493 F. Supp. 2d 723 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
POSNER, ECONoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 68, at 628.
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By mandating an event study, the federal courts impose a considerable cost
on the parties, increasing the overall cost of securities litigation.
2. An Event Study Requirement Inflicts Significant Harm on
Meritorious Actions.
Not only does the event study requirement serve illusory ends, but it also
impedes meritorious actions unnecessarily. 409 As this Part shows, requiring posttransaction declines for securities fraud actions enables savvy defendants to conceal
fraudulent conduct. Moreover, securities class actions serve the convenience of the
parties, encourage efficient judicial administration, 410 and promote the market's integrity by supplementing otherwise deficient SEC enforcement. Also, private securities class actions compensate harmed investors, providing a much needed remedy
when there has been a wrong. Last, it is important to note that increased securities
trials may actually serve to lower securities litigation costs.
a.

Letting the Air out of the Inflation Balloon: Requiring PostTransaction Decline Enables Concealment of Fraud.

Requiring that plaintiffs offer an event study that links post-transaction price
decline to the defendant's fraudulent conduct provides a ready tool with which defendants can conceal fraud. Because the plaintiffs must link the disclosure of the
fraud to a drop in the stock price, sophisticated defendants can release information in
such a way that their fraud will be revealed to the market through innocuous appearing announcements, and only then when the fraudulent information has been fully
corrected in the market price, announce that a fraud occurred.411 "If plaintiffs must
establish that the defendants' fraud caused a post-disclosure price correction, then a
savvy entity could escape liability for its fraud that clearly harmed investors." 412 In409

See Rudman, supra note 1 ("The disadvantage that Oscar's holding causes to in-

vestors is evidenced by the decisions of the district courts in the Fifth Circuit that have followed Oscar's approach in requiring proof of loss causation at class certification. These district
court decisions have led to premature dismissal of potentially meritorious claims, thereby
leaving injured plaintiffs without possibility of recovery.").
410
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 185 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
411 Kaufman, Loss Causation Revisited, supra note 329.
412 Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Thorsen, supra note 12, at 120 (stating that
this approach gives defendants a wild card and encourages companies to affirmatively guide
down expectations to mute the effect of fraud); Coughlin, supra note 305, at 26 (warning of the
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deed, this was the exact allegation in a recent securities fraud case before the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Ceridian.413 In In re Ceridian, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant corporation announced that it was restating its financial statements five times over two years and that it calibrated the restatements to "leak this
information in bits and pieces to walk the stock price down, thereby avoiding the catastrophic impact of a single cumulative disclosure of massive accounting violations." 414
Additionally, in cases of clear fraud, if the stock price substantially declines
prior to a formal announcement of fraud, leaving little room for further decline after
the fraud is announced, plaintiffs suffering from legitimate harm have no remedy.415
An event study requirement assumes that "undisclosed fraud [is] an ordinary market
risk that investors are expected to bear. This logic is entirely contrary to the purpose
of the federal securities law - to prevent that particular risk from entering into the
marketplace in the first instance."416 As the Supreme Court in Basic stated, "a fundamental purpose of the various Securities Acts was to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for a philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry." 417
b.Private Actions Supplement Otherwise Deficient SEC
Actions.
Additionally, private causes of action for securities fraud serve two vital
functions as they relate to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"): (1) they
supplement enforcement efforts; and (2) they ensure against agency capture by the
industry. 418
First, private causes of action supplement the SEC's securities regulation enforcement power. 419 Private and public enforcement is complementary: both securi-

risk of a sophisticated entity, adept at committing fraud, and adept at concealing it, walking
down the stock price with selective disclosures to avoid a sudden stock-price reaction).
413 In re Ceridian Corp. Sec. Litig., 542 F.3d 240, 245 (8th Cir. 2008); Coughlin, supra
note 305, at 27-31 (discussing three additional real world problems focusing exclusively on
disclosure-induced stock drops, including Enron, WorldCom, and HealthSouth).
414 In re Ceridian Corp. Sec. Litig., 542 F.3d at 245.
415
Eisenhofer, supra note 83, at 1441-42; see also Thorsen, supra note 12 (stating that
requiring a disclosure that precisely reverses the prior misrepresentation deprives persons
who actually suffered inflationary loss from any recovery).
416 Thorsen, supra note 12, at 120 (emphasis added).
417
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988) (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
418 Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 5 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 379 (2007).
419
In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("[T]he
class action device is viewed as a necessary and desirable supplement to enforcement efforts of
the Securities and Exchange Commission."). The risk of restricting shareholders' ability to
combat fraud through private litigation becomes especially critical in light of the heavy burden
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ties plaintiffs' attorneys and the SEC seek to recover damages on behalf of investors
for violations of the securities laws.420 Private securities class actions have been justified as a necessary supplement to SEC enforcement because the SEC cannot monitor
the nation's markets alone.421 Congress has recognized this through its enactment of
the PSLRA. 4 22
Moreover, the SEC, as a government organization, is limited by other bu-

already placed on regulators who are not in a position to replace the efforts of private attorneys general. Hufford, supra note 369, at 638. "There is little dispute about the centrality of
private actions in enforcing the complex web of securities law. Indeed, the most sophisticated
critical assessments of securities laws turn not on the lack of public enforcement, but on the
insufficiency of private enforcement to deter misconduct as a result of complicated incentive
structures . . . ." Issacharoff, supra note 418, at 381.
420
Hufford, supra note 369, at 596; Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Commissioner, Speech at
North American Securities Administrators Association's Winter Enforcement Conference:
Empowering the Markets Watchdog to Effect Real Results (Jan. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov [hereinafter Aguilar, Empowering the Markets] ("The SEC's mission is
very clear. It is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets; and facilitate
capital formation.").
421
See, e.g., Marcy Gordon, SEC Enforcement Chief Linda Thomsen Leaving Amid CritiTRiB., Feb. 9, 2009, available at
cism of Agency's Failure in Madoff Case, CHI.
www.chicagotribune.com/business/sns-ap-enforcement-chief-resignation,06505866.story
(stating that the SEC Commission was a lightning rod of criticism for the SEC's failure to detect a
fifty billion dollar Ponzi scheme despite red flags raised by outsiders over the course of a decade); Amit R. Paley & David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Chief Defends His Restraint, WASH. PosT, Dec.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp2008,
at
Al,
24,
dyn/content/article/2008/12/23/AR2008122302765_pf.html (stating that the SEC failed to detect
the fraud of the largest Ponzi scheme in history); Theo Francis, SEC's Cox Catches Blame for Financial
Crisis,
Bus.
WEEK,
Sept.
19,
2008,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/print/bwdaily/dnflash/content/sep2008/db20080918_764469.ht
m (quoting the former head of the Congressional Budget Office as stating that the SEC "failed
in its most fundamental oversight and surveillance functions."); Nicholas Rummell, Tumble in
Restatements Sparks Criticism of SEC, FIN. WEEK, Aug. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.financialweek.com (stating that a steep decline in restatements and material
weaknesses in 2008 was more to do with a sleepier securities watchdog than with compliance
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). There is also evidence that the SEC suffers from certain behavioral biases. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 20-37 (2003) (cataloguing behavioral biases, such as bounded search, bounded rationality, availability and hindsight, framing, overconfidence, confirmation, and group think biases,
that plague the SEC). While there is no indication that these same biases do not also affect pri-

vate enforcers, plural forms of enforcement of the securities laws lessens the likelihood that
one bias will dominant effective enforcement.
422
See Geoffrey C. Rapp, Beyond Protection:Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley
Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 91, 105 (2007) ("Congress could
have simply eliminated private rights of action with the PSLRA, but chose not to. Congress
found that private securities litigation amounted to an indispensable tool that promotes public
and global confidence in our capital markets and helps deter wrongdoing.") (quotations omitted).
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reaucratic barriers absent from private enforcement. 423 Until recently, bureaucratic
constraints caused SEC investigations and subpoenas to logjam. 424 An additional
vice of public enforcement- absent from private attorneys general-is that the SEC
as an enforcement agency has been hampered with inadequate funding.425 The SEC
is annually appropriated and apportioned, subjecting it to political pressures virtually year round. 426 As one SEC Commissioner noted: "In the last few years, the Enforcement Division of the SEC has been coping with less staff and fewer resources.
This is clearly not what has been needed in a time of deregulation and clearly not
what Congress had in mind when it enacted Sarbanes-Oxley." 427 Indeed, by 2006,
SEC staff turnover was at its highest level in five years and the number of attorneys
in well-staffed enforcement groups dwindled. 428 From 2005 to 2008, the total number
of attorneys able to investigate fraud cases decreased by ten percent.429 The SEC's
budget allocation has been relatively flat from 2005 to 2008 as well.430 A stagnant
SEC budget has had severe consequences.431 Compare the SEC's budget with that of
the FDIC's:
With often less than $900 million in hand and approximately
423

Gordon, supra note 421 (stating that there were serious questions about the im-

partiality and fairness of the SEC's investigation of alleged insider trading scheme for a hedge
fund and claiming there was alleged political interference into the investigation by agency of-

ficials); Paley & Hilzenrath, supra note 421, at A01 (describing how SEC Chief, Christopher
Cox, agreed to three-week ban on short selling because of intense pressure from the Treasury
Secretary and Federal Reserve Chairman); Issacharoff, supra note 418, at 381 (stating that private enforcement frees individuals from dependence on collective bureaucratic remedies and
gives them a personal stake in administering justice).
424
Aguilar, Empowering the Markets, supra note 420. However, newly appointed
Mary Schapiro has changed this bureaucratic structure by replacing antiquated approval orders with 'permission slips' to be approved by a single member of the Commission rather than
all five. Mary L. Schapiro, SEC Chairman, Address to Practising Law Institute's 'SEC Speaks
in 2009' Program (Feb. 6, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov).
425
Paley & Hilzenrath, supra note 421, at A01 (quoting Colleen M. Kelly, the presi-

dent of the National Treasury Employees Union, as stating that there have not been enough
resources or staffing over the years for the SEC to oversee the number of companies for which
it is responsible).
426 Aguilar, Empowering the Markets, supra note 420.
427
Id. The SEC has had to freeze hiring as well to keep pace with year-to-year expense increases. Id.
428
Id. (noting that enforcement groups composed of fifteen lawyers often had only

seven or eight lawyers by 2006).
429
43o

Id.

Id. (stating that the budget was 888 million in 2005, 888.1 in 2006, 888.6 in 2007,

and 906 million in 2008).

431
Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Commissioner, Remarks at the 'SEC Speaks in 2009': Increasing Accountability and Transparency to Investors (Feb. 6, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov) [hereinafter Aguilar, Increasing Accountability] (stating that a stagnant
SEC budget results in a limited hiring ability, difficulty in retaining adequate staff, limited
technological advancements, curbed development, and limited ability to initiate new programs and investigations).
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3,500 staff, the SEC is tasked with regulating tens of thousands of
entities including public companies, investment advisers, brokerdealers, transfer agents, exchanges, credit rating agencies, and several SROs.... [Tihe FDIC has a staff of 5,000 to oversee 8,300 FDIC insured banks with a budget in the range from $1.2 to $2.2 billion dollars. Moreover, the FDIC is independently funded and thus, has
control over its own budget and long term projects. 432
In 2009 SEC Commissioners acknowledged that the SEC has been disempowered and the focus of the SEC has been on cases with little market reach.433 As a result, private enforcement fills this gap. A recent study from NERA Economic Consulting indicates that this is precisely what happens: "[M]ost SEC settlements do not
parallel shareholder class actions. In 2007, only 22% of SEC settlements were with
public companies or their employees and related to misstatements, and were therefore closely comparable to shareholder class actions." 434 Thus, where public enforcement stops, private enforcement picks up, providing holistic regulation of the
securities markets.
Aside from bureaucratic barriers, there now exists some support for the tentative hypothesis that SEC officials may not engage in truly impartial enforcement; in
other words, there is evidence of agency capture. 435 For example, a recent study concludes that the SEC pursues broker-dealer violations by initiating administrative
proceedings as opposed to civil lawsuits to avoid courts because they are a worse fo-

432

Aguilar, Increasing Accountability, supra note 431.

Aguilar, Empowering the Markets, supra note 420 (calling for empowerment of
enforcement staff and a concentration of resources on cases with greater market reach).
434 Jan Larsen et al., SEC Settlements: A New Era Post-Sox, NERA Economic Consulting,
7
(Nov.
2008),
available
at
http://www.nera.com/image/SettlementsReport 8.5x11_1108.pdf. A recent study by Pricewaterhouse Coopers reports that there was a five percent decrease in SEC involvement with the
filings of securities class actions. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP, 2008 Securities Litigation
Study,
at
32,
available
at
http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-090894%20SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY%20FINAL.PDF. In fact, the last time SEC involvement was as low as it has been in 2008 and 2007 was as far back as 1999. Id.
435 Stavros Gadinis, Is Investor Protection the Top Priority of SEC Enforcement? Evidence
from Actions Against Broker-Dealers, 5 (HARV. JOHN M. OLIN CTR. FOR LAW, EcoN., AND Bus.
available
at
27,
2009,
Paper
No.
Discussion
FELLOWS,
Working
http://www.law.harvad.edu/programs/olin-center/). See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Zvika
Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics, 28-33 (HARV. JOHN M. OLIN CTR. FOR
LAW, EcoN., AND Bus. FELLOWS, Working Discussion Paper No. 603, Nov. 1, 2008,
http://ssm.com/abstract=1030355) (discussing how lobbying by interest groups can affect the
level of investor protection). The authors of this Article truly doubt that such behavior is intentional. Nevertheless, the fact that it occurs is disconcerting.
433
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rum for finance professionals.436 In addition, in administrative cases, the study concludes that for the same violation and comparable levels of harm to investors, big
firms and their employees are less likely to receive a ban from the securities industry
when compared to small firms and their employees.437 The study then discredits the
possibility that these enforcement disparities can be explained by the arguably better
compliance systems larger firms have in place by finding that small and big firm violations for failing to supervise subordinates were virtually indistinguishable.438
Last, the study connects the enforcement disparity to post-SEC career trajectories of
agency officials."39 As a result, the study concludes that SEC officials may be responding to future employment prospects by giving prospective employers favorable
treatment.440
The public/private partnership that has evolved contributes to a more comprehensive enforcement of the securities laws.441 Corporate officials will have a
strong desire to avoid accusations of fraud, even if they come only in the form of a
private securities lawsuit.42 Thus, private securities class actions empower an otherwise impotent class of harmed investors that may have been lost in the bureaucratic shuffle or self-serving aims of SEC officials.4 3
c.Securities Class Actions Compensate Investor-Plaintiffs.
Private securities class actions supplement SEC enforcement, while also
compensating injured investors. "With more investment opportunities available including increasingly complex financial products, and more investors relying on
managers and other intermediaries, the need for honesty and integrity is greater than
ever. Investor confidence has been badly shaken, and we need to reestablish stability
by returning to the bedrock principle that the capital markets should be known for

Gadinis, supranote 435, at 4.
Id.
438 Id. at 5.
439 Id.
440 Id. The problem of revolving doors in government practice comes as no surprise
as even lawyer ethics rules address such concerns. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESP. 1.9, 1.10,
436

437

1.11. However, affording different SEC sanctions based on employment prospects does not
serve any legitimate public policy.
441 LaCroix, supra note 385 (paraphrasing Professor James Cox's debate at the Forum
for Institutional Investors).
442 LaCroix, supra note 385. Indeed, corporate officials have more of a desire to
avoid private accusations of fraud as those accusations may raise the specter of SEC enforcement.
443 Nancy Trejos, Irate Investors Filing More Class-Action Lawsuits, L.A. TimES, Jan. 20,
2009,
available
at
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-investsuits202009jan20,0,4581867,print.story ("To cut down on legal expenses and exert their power in
numbers, investors are banding together in securities class-action lawsuits.").
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their integrity and honesty."4" Yet "a securities class-action plaintiff must thread the
eye of a needle made smaller and smaller over the years by judicial decree and congressional action."445 As Justice Stevens has recognized, plaintiffs wronged in the
market should have a remedy.446 A recent news report claims that securities classaction plaintiffs claim that they have lost as much as $856 billion dollars." 7
Despite these astounding losses, scholars criticize securities class actions,
claiming that they serve no valid compensatory function.48 The seminal criticism of
securities fraud class actions claims that active traders with diversified portfolios are
as likely to be on the gaining side of a transaction tainted by securities fraud as on the
losing side.449 In other words, as often as an investor loses five dollars on account of
fraud, that same investor is just as likely to gain five dollars on account of fraud.
Thus, under this portfolio theory diversified investors have no expected net losses
from fraud because their expected losses will match their expected gains.450 Howev-

4"
Aguilar, Empowering the Markets, supra note 420. Commissioner Mary L. Schapiro noted in a speech given in February:
Trillions of dollars of wealth have been lost. Our economy is in recession. And investor confidence has been badly shaken. Middle-class
families who were relying on that nest egg to send a son or daughter to college or for a secure retirement now don't know where to turn.
Schapiro, Address to Practising Law Institute, supranote 424.
445 Ala. Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009).
446
Stoneridge Invs. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 180 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congress enacted § 10(b) with the understanding that federal courts
respected the principle that every wrong would have a remedy.").

Trejos, supra note 443.
448 Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CoRP. L. 223, 225 (2007)
(discussing Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel's article concerning the inefficiency of securities class action damages).
449
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52
U. CI. L. REV. 611, 642 (1985). The fact that a large number of sophisticated, well-informed
and profit motivated institutional investors continue to actively participate in these cases however indicates that these institutions believe that litigation is within their financial interest.
LaCroix, supra note 385. Indeed, in 2008, public and union pension funds were lead plaintiff in
forty-eight percent of all cases filed during 2008. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP, 2008 Securities Litigation Study, at 26,
http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-09-0894%20SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY%20FINAL.PDF.
Other critics contend that the private action serves only to transfer wealth from one
shareholder to the next. Coffee, supra note 367. However, studies demonstrate that securities
settlements typically fall within available insurance coverage, indicating that money is not
going from just shareholder to shareholder. Baker & Griffith, supra note 406, at 761 ("[T]he
vast majority of securities claims settle within or just above the limits of the defendant corporation's D&O coverage."); see also James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39
ARiz. L. REV. 497, 511-13 (1997).
450
Evans, The Investor CompensationFund, supra note 448, at 225 (citing Frank H. Eas447
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er, as Professor Alicia Davis Evans ascertains, "securities fraud can cause substantial
injury to investors of all types. Compensation, therefore, is justified to make those
investors whole."451 Professor Evans first establishes that there is a fundamental
asymmetry from a market's reaction to fraudulent announcements. 452 For gains and
losses to be equivalent over time, according to Evans, an investor must find himself
on the winning side of fraud-tainted trades more, by dollar volume, than the investor
finds himself on the losing side because losses of investors on the losing side of
trades tainted by fraud likely exceed the gains of the investors on the winning side of
these trades. 453 An oversimplified explanation of Evans's assertion would be as follows: Gains from fraud-tainted trades amount to only five dollars, but losses from
fraud-tainted transactions amount to ten dollars. Thus, for gains to equal losses,
there must be twice as many fraud-tainted gains to offset the fraud-tainted losses.
Second, according to Evans, even large, diversified investors are not immune
to this asymmetry and can suffer substantial losses.454 Evans explains that the findings from a 2005 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform indicate that
it is possible for gains and losses to be significantly different for even large, diversified investors. 455 Moreover, even if a diversified institutional investor could come
out ahead, at a minimum, this does not apply to the initial public offering and merger-and-acquisition contexts. 456 Third, Evans clarifies that even losses of buy-andhold investors are likely to exceed any gains from fraud because one must sell stocks
with prices that are inflated by fraud as often as one buys stocks with prices that are
inflated by fraud.457 Last, Evans notes that the portfolio theory only applies to diver-

terbrook & Daniel R. Fishel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L.
(1985)).

REV.

611, 641

Id. at 228.
Id. at 229. Consumers of all types, whether they are buying orange juice or eggs,
exhibit this asymmetrical behavior, overacting to bad news. ORI BRAFMAN & ROM BRAFMAN,
SWAY: THE IRRESISTIBLE PULL OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 17-19 (2008) (discussing purchasers' more
451
452

intense reaction when the price of eggs and juice rises as compared with purchasers' reaction
when the price drops).
453

Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, supra note 448, at 229. Additionally, the

"portfolio theory is not raised as an objection to other types of commercial litigation where one
company sues another to recover damages. The same pocket shifting argument could be applied to all commercial litigation, but no one is suggesting that all commercial litigation be
eliminated as unjustified under the portfolio theory." LaCroix, supra note 385 (paraphrasing
Professor Cox).
454 Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, supra note 448, at 230.
4ss Id. at 231.
456
LaCroix, supra note 385 (discussing Professor Cox's statements at the Forum for
Institutional Investors).
457
Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, supra note 448, at 232. Professor Evans

sets forth the following hypothetical to illustrate:
Imagine the extreme case of the buy-and-hold investor that buys,
but never sells (i.e., she holds the stocks in her portfolio until infinity). If this
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sified investors and that undiversified investors can suffer substantial harm from securities fraud. 458 Thus, concluding that there is an ascertainable wrong, there ought
to be a remedy. 459
Further, Congress has indicated that securities actions serve a compensatory
purpose. In 2002, Congress enacted Section 308 of Sarbanes-Oxley ("SOX"), or the
"Fair Fund Provision." 460 The Fair Fund Provision established a system whereby the
SEC could distribute funds recovered from civil penalties for federal securities law
violations. 461 The Fair Fund Provision has been used as a flagstaff for the business
community's campaign against private actions; because the SEC can collect funds for
injured investors, private litigation is unnecessary. 462 The presence of this Fair Fund
Provision, however, actually aids the argument for private enforcement. The pres-

investor purchases a stock with a price that is inflated by fraud, the amount
of this overpayment will never be recouped by a gain from selling a stock
that also has an inflated price. This investor never sells. It is, of course,
somewhat unrealistic to speak of an investor that never sells stock. Liquidity needs prompt virtually every investor to sell some stock eventually.
However, the net buyer (rare seller) is not likely to have equivalent gains
and losses from fraud. Thus, it is clear that this type of investor, who is following rational investment strategy, is not going to be economically indifferent to the incidence of fraud.
Id.
458
Id. at 235-36. This point should not be readily dismissed. In an age where stock
trading is within the keystrokes of almost every individual, see E*Trade, more and more unsophisticated investors will be able to dabble in market investment who lack the wherewithal to
develop a diversified portfolio.
459 Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, supra note 448, at 235-36.
460 Sarbanes-Oxley, § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2002). Section 308(a) states that if in
any judicial or administrative action brought by the SEC under the securities laws the SEC obtains an order requiring disgorgement against any person for violating any such securities
laws or regulations, or such a person agrees in settlement of such actions to disgorgement, and
the SEC obtains a civil penalty against such person, the amount of that penalty shall become
part of a disgorgement fund for the benefit of the victims of such violations. Id.
461 Id.
462
Barbara Black, Should the SEC be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63
Bus. LAW. 317, 319 (2008). Professor Black maintains that the recovery should not be a primary

aim of the SEC's enforcement policy however, because the SEC has many other competing
considerations-such as the enforcement of aiding and abetting liability, enforcement against
small companies, and enforcement against individuals -that are essential to ensuring the integrity of American financial markets. Id. at 342-45.
Black's hypothesis appears to be supported by data. While during 2007 the SEC saw
its first increase in new accounting-related litigation since the enactment of SOX in 2002, in
2008, the number of new accounting-related litigation releases fell once again. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP, 2008 Securities Litigation Study 36 (2009), http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY09-0894%20SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY%20FINAL.PDF. Correlatively, in 2008, the SEC
reached record settlements in the history of the SEC. Id. at 38.
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ence of this Fair Fund Provision indicates Congress's recognition that plaintiffs do
indeed suffer damages and that securities actions serve a compensatory function. If
securities actions did not compensate investors, this Fair Fund Provision of SOX
would be just as futile and detrimental as private recovery. The Fair Fund Provision
provides an emphatic "yes" to whether compensating investors is ever a worthwhile
goal. This, taken together with the above assertion that private enforcement supplements otherwise deficient SEC actions, establishes a compelling compensatory basis
for private securities fraud actions.463
d.

Additional Securities Fraud Suits Will Not Inevitably Result
in a Flood of Expensive Suits.

Last, it is important to address the concern that absent heightened pleading
and evidentiary requirements, such as the event study requirement, too many securities fraud actions will proceed to trial. Yet an increase in securities fraud trials and a
proper interpretation of summary judgment - the one offered by Professor Thomas -

would not result in the hyperbolic parade of horribles.464 Professor Thomas notes
that summary judgment is used in a limited set of cases and the presence or absence
of summary judgment would not affect litigants' desire to settle. 465 The absence of
the rigorous summary judgment standard currently in place may encourage settlement to remove the possibility of outlier jury verdicts from trials.466 Yet there is a
particular concern in securities cases that any procedural standard which is less than
rigorous would encourage plaintiffs to file more cases with weak evidence. Thus, the
absence of the current summary judgment device would lead to more frivolous
claims. But the absence of summary judgment for securities actions in particular
would not result in a deluge of meritless claims and excessive jury verdicts. Currently, more securities class actions are dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage.467 The
majority of remaining cases settles before getting to the summary judgment stage. 468

463 See supra Part VI.B.2 (stating that the SEC is marred by bureaucratic red tape and
other agency restrictions absent in private enforcement). The SEC as a source of compensation
only makes sense in limited circumstances: (1) when no private right of action exists, or (2)
when public enforcement is cheaper than a private action. Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the
SEC's Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1131-41 (2008).
464
Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply, supra 251, at
1684.
465 Id.
466 Id.

467

Markedly, Cornerstone Research reports that among class actions resolved after

filing in 2005, forty-one percent were dismissed. Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action
(2008),
available
at
Year
in
Review,
16
Filings:
2008
A
http://securities.comerstone.com/pdfs/YIR2008.
468 Id.
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In other words, on a purely quantitative basis, the presence or absence of summary
judgment will not have a significant effect.
Additionally, the absence of summary judgment may actually lower securities litigation and settlement costs. First, refusing summary judgment frees significant judicial resources.469 The courts will no longer have to review evidence presented on motions for summary judgment and litigants will no longer have to go
through the expense of preparing a motion for summary judgment. Second, by encouraging securities fraud actions to go to trial, settlement amounts may lower on
average. In a recent article by Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, the authors insightfully demonstrate how additional verdicts can result in lower settlements.470 Consider
the following:
Current securities fraud settlements are based on available insurance cover47
1
age.
Insurance policies cover expected losses, which in turn are based on predicted jury verdicts.
Additional securities verdicts resulting in findings for the defendants, or just
lower than sought after damages, would add additional lower figures upon which insurers can base their coverage policies. 472
Less available insurance coverage would translate into lower securities fraud
settlements.
In other words, additional data-findings for the defendant or low verdicts -can lower sought after damages. But because so few securities fraud lawsuits
actually result in a verdict, 473 there is little data upon which to gauge the likelihood of

469

Thomas, Summary Judgment, supra note 252, at 178-79.

Baker & Griffith, supra note 406.
Id. at 761 ("[T]he vast majority of securities claims settle within or just above the
limits of the defendant corporation's D&O coverage.").
472
See id. at 786. "If, as is generally the case, D&O insurance limits are significantly
lower than potential investor losses, then average settlements will tend to be pulled down to a
range closer to typical policy limits. Average settlement amounts thus reflect trends in D&O
insurance policies as much as they do the severity of corporate fraud." Id. at 805.
473 Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith state:
Trial ... is virtually unheard of. In an empirical study going back
to 1980, a period in which thousands of securities fraud cases were filed,
Black, Cheffins, and Klausner found only thirty-seven securities law cases
seeking damages they were tried to judgment. RiskMetrics' Securities Litigation Watch reports that only six cases have gone to trial since 1996. The
JDS Uniphase trial in late 2007 would appear to be the exception that proves
the rule. As a result, once a claim survives a motion to dismiss, all involved
know the odds strongly favor an eventual settlement.
470
471
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success of an action. 474 The lack of securities fraud trials "skew[s] the process of settlement by which most cases have ended and continue to end. [The] loss is disorienting for lawyers seeking to value and settle cases: without trials we would have a context suffused with legal uncertainty because the disputing parties' assessment of both
the merit and magnitude of their case would correspond only coincidentally." 475
Thus, as of now, securities settlements and available insurance coverage may overestimate a securities plaintiffs true likelihood of recovery. Additional verdicts may set
a lower benchmark for securities class action settlements. Therefore, additional securities fraud trials may lower securities litigation costs.
VII. Conclusion.
A reliable event study is now the crux of a securities fraud action. A reliable
event study can demonstrate a material disparity, reliance on the market price, and
economic loss and loss causation by subsequent price movement. The essential elements of a securities fraud claim have been folded into a single question: whether the
plaintiff has offered a reliable event study. A plaintiff who fails to put forth an event
study analysis by a qualified expert has little chance of success. Perhaps seduced by
the illusion of certainty created by a statistical regression analysis, the federal courts
have begun to bar victims of securities fraud from pursuing otherwise valid claims if
they cannot produce this analysis before trial. As demonstrated by this Article, however, this event study requirement poses considerable Seventh Amendment concerns
and is inconsistent with the federal securities laws. The requirement undoubtedly
will preclude juries from assessing the proper measure of damages to award to the
victims of securities fraud who have otherwise proven each of the essential elements
of their securities fraud claims. It serves illusory aims at the expense of inhibiting
merited securities claims.

Id. at 776 (internal citations omitted).
474 BURNS, supra note 283, at 89, 91.
475 Id. at 120.
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